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Abstract 
This report describes an integrated flood catastrophe model as well as some results of a case study 
made in the Upper Tisza region in northeastern Hungary: the Palad-Csecsei basin (the pilot basin). 
The background data was provided through the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and complemented 
by interviews with different stakeholders in the region. Based upon these data, where a large degree 
of uncertainty is prevailing, we demonstrate how an implementation of a simulation and decision 
analytical model can provide insights into the effects of imposing different policy options for a flood 
risk management program in the region. We focus herein primarily on general options for designing 
a public-private insurance and reinsurance system for Hungary. Obviously, this is a multi-criteria and 
multi-stakeholder problem and cannot be solved using standard approaches. It should however be 
emphasized that the main purpose of this report not is to provide any definite recommendations, but 
rather to explore a set of policy packages that could gain a consensus among the stakeholders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Rivers and their corridors of flood plains fulfil a variety of functions both for human use 
and for the natural ecosystem, i.e. they are fundamental parts of the natural, economic, 
and social system wherever they occur. At the same time, rivers might be the largest 
threats to entire areas. Besides fires, floods are the most common and widespread of all 
natural disasters, killing in average yearly 150 people and causing over 3 billion US $ in 
property damage (FEMA 00). Moreover, national average annual flood losses continue 
to increase. In recent years, much attention has therefore been given to the management 
of natural disasters and, in particular, to floods. An event that initiated the discussions 
was the 1992 flash flood in France, where 42 people were killed in the Vaison-la-
Romaine (Samuels 98). However, despite dedicated efforts of governments and the 
private sector to mitigate flood hazards, problems still remain with current practices, 
including methods of design and construction of building utilities. Furthermore, driven 
by the increasing frequency of floods, the need for evaluation and strategic flood 
planning tools has increased (Evans 00). Consequently, in several countries it is 
recognized that programs for efficiently and effectively linking private and public 
responsibility and insurance, as well as loss mitigation, need to be created. 
In the Tisza region in the northeastern part of Hungary, there are annual floods. 
Furthermore, extreme floods are expected every 10-12 years (Vári 99). Financial losses 
from floods are severe in this region, and costs for compensation to victims and 
mitigation strategies are increasing. In Hungary, as in other countries, the government is 
looking for alternative flood management strategies, where part of the economic 
responsibility is transferred from the public to the private sector. In the design of 
different flood management strategies, a key interest for the Hungarian government has 
been to find the balance between social solidarity and private responsibility. Today, 
most Hungarians perceive that the government should compensate them for the losses, 
but such a policy is not affordable. Moreover, there are many different interests 
represented by the tourist industry, other industries, farmers, environmental groups and 
other NGO’s, (non-governmental organizations) that have to be taken into account. 
Consequently, there is a strong need for other loss sharing policies which different 
stakeholders, e.g., governments, insurers and individuals, could agree upon. Hungary is 
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a country where as much as 20 per cent of its 93,000 square meters of territory are at 
risk for flooding. During the past decades, the central government has spent huge sums 
on building and maintaining extensive levee systems along the main rivers to protect the 
endangered land and communities. The government has not only taken the pre-flood 
responsibility, but also the post-flood responsibility. If a flood occurs in a protected 
area, this is considered to be the responsibility of the government, and the government 
has by tradition compensated the victims. For instance, after the recent devastating 
floods of the river Tisza, in 1999, the government paid full compensation for all 
damaged private properties. 
During 1999, a number of interviews with stakeholders in the Upper Tisza region 
were performed (Vári 99), with the purpose of identifying realistic flood management 
strategies considered fair by the different stakeholders in the region and elsewhere. 
Based on the interviews, three alternative flood management policy strategies were 
formulated, and this report investigates the effects of imposing these strategies. The 
strategies are not necessarily optimal in any respect, but are constructed for the purpose 
of illuminating significant effects of adopting different insurance policies. 
Consequently, a main issue has been to investigate different insurance schemes in 
combination with level of governmental compensation. In particular, the subsidiary 
level has been studied, i.e., the amount of money transferred from low-risk areas to 
high-risk areas as well as from reasonably wealthy property owners to less wealthy 
ones. 
This report is based on a case study of the Palad-Csecsei basin (the pilot basin), 
which is situated in the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County in northeastern Hungary and 
inhabited by 4,621 persons. This region is one of the poorest agricultural regions of 
Europe, and floods repeatedly strike large areas. In particular, the second largest river in 
Hungary, the Tisza River, flows trough the county. The pilot basin consists of eleven 
municipalities, of which primarily two experience flood damages.  
Based upon statistical data and interviews, we demonstrate how an implementation 
of a simulation and decision analytical model can provide some insights on the effects 
of imposing different policy options for a flood risk management program in the region. 
We focus herein primarily on general options for designing a public-private insurance 
and reinsurance system for Hungary. The emphasis is on the multi-criteria and multi-
stakeholder issues involved as well as the high degree of uncertainty in the background 
data.  
Section 2 describes a tool for flood consequence simulation applied to the pilot basin 
with different settings for the three scenarios. Section 3 describes how the results from 
the simulations can be used from a decision theoretical viewpoint for investigating the 
relation between the different scenarios taking the different stakeholders into 
consideration. Section 4 summarizes a number of interviews performed with the 
purpose of investigating the degree of acceptance of the different scenarios. The 
interviewees received the simulation results beforehand and made their judgments with 
this background as a component. Section 5 concludes the report. Finally, there is also a 
set of appendices. These consists of more elaborated descriptions of the flood 
simulation model and the decision analytical model as well as transcripts of the 
interviews.  
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2. SIMULATING FLOOD FAILURE 
Due to the inherent infrequency of natural disasters, it is impossible to predict the time, 
the location, or the magnitude of a flood. The shortcomings of statistical methods 
emphasize the role of models for evaluating new policies in presence of dependencies 
and lack of data, c.f. (Ekenberg 00). Needless to say, this uncertainty can be treated in a 
multitude of ways, but a quite common approach is to study the uncertainties explicitly 
by considering the flood-related variables as stochastic variables, in a probability 
theoretical sense.  
Computer based simulations are increasingly used to understand how micro order 
actions affect the macro order outcome, see for instance (Axelrod 97), (Gilbert 99) and 
(Conte 97). Simulations are a most convenient approach in this case, since it would be 
very hard to determine an analytical solution to this problem. The model described 
below takes such an approach as well using estimated flood failures as stochastic 
variables in the simulations. A flood failure is something that occurs when the flood 
overtops a structural flood mitigation measure. The latter could, for instance, be a levee 
breakage. The reason for restricting the simulations to flood failures only is that 
insurance companies compensate damages caused by failures, but not damages caused 
by ground water related floods. 
Nine different flood failure scenarios have been implemented in the model. This is 
based on the assumption that the flood can be of three different magnitudes, and that a 
failure can occur at three different locations. The financial damages are estimated for all 
flooded properties for the nine failure scenarios. Thus, in the present version of the 
model, we use ten different possible scenarios (nine with flood failures and one 
without), simulated 10 000 times over a period of ten years.  
Simulation approaches seem to be the most suitable ones in these kinds of scenarios. 
The number of different possible outcomes of 10 possible scenarios each year over a 
period of 10 years is 92378 (19!/(9!⋅10!)) for each of the three different flood 
management strategies. Consequently, the number of possible scenarios makes the 
problem quite complex and not really suited for a more analytical treatment. This is 
particularly the case when having a decision analytical approach as well. 
2.1 THE FLOOD MODEL 
The flood model consists of different modules. A brief description of the functionality 
of the modules is given in the following sections. See Appendix 3 for more detailed 
information on the flood model and the settings. See also (Brouwers 01) and (Brouwers 
02) for a more thorough discussion of the model.  
Two stochastic variables are used to represent flood uncertainties. One variable 
Magnitude represents, for each simulation year, whether there is a 100-year flood, a 
150-year flood, a 1000-year flood, or no flood. The probabilities for these events are 
1/100, 1/150, 1/1000 and 1-(1/100+1/150+1/1000), respectively. The other variable 
Failure represents whether the flood causes a levee failure at one or none of the three 
locations. The following probability distributions for these 10 possibilities are used. 
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Magnitude Failure Probability 
100-year flood  Location 1 0,12 
100-year flood  Location 2 0,20 
100-year flood  Location 3 0,28 
150-year flood  Location 1 0,18 
150-year flood  Location 2 0,22 
150-year flood  Location 3 0,40 
1000-year flood Location 1 0,19 
1000-year flood Location 2 0,33 
1000-year flood Location 3 0,45 
No flood Location 1-3 0,00 
Table 1 Probabilities for failures at different locations (From (VIT 99)) 
Based on this, the stochastic variables are assigned random values through a Monte-
Carlo simulation. These outcomes are passed to the Catastrophe module, where the 
value of the stochastic variable Failure is checked. For each of the nine failure 
scenarios, the Catastrophe module calculates the inundated land area as well as the 
water level.  
The Spatial module calculates the vulnerability of inundated land. The module uses 
a grid representation of the pilot basin with 1551⋅1551 cells, where each cell represents 
an area of 10 square meters. For each cell there are several relevant parameters, e.g., soil 
type, land-use pattern, digital elevation, and property value. In the simulations, only 
structural flood losses are considered, why agricultural data is omitted.  
For each simulated year, when a flood failure has occurred, the financial 
consequences for the different stakeholders are collected and saved in the Consequence 
Module. The module calculates, for each inundated cell, the financial consequences, 
based on property values and vulnerability for all inundated cells. The latter values are 
received from the Spatial Module. The structural losses are estimated by a loss-function, 
which considers initial property value and vulnerability as well as level and duration of 
inundating water. 
The stakeholders represented in the flood model are the municipalities, the insurance 
companies, the individual property owners, and the central government. In the end of 
each simulated year, the financial situations for all agents are updated (Hansson 01). If 
there was a failure, the property values are reduced for the affected cells. Premiums are 
paid annually, but individual property owners can normally choose whether to buy 
insurance or not. This choice affects the outcome both for the individuals and for the 
insurance company. The financial consequences also depend on the current flood 
management strategy, i.e. the compensation level from the government and the 
insurance companies.  
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2.2 SIMULATIONS 
This section describes the settings for the simulations, and a description of the financial 
indicators that are being examined. The indicators from the simulations are: 
 Governmental load: Compensation from government (in addition to subsidies and 
contribution to re-insurance fund in Scenario 3). 
 Balance for the insurance companies: Income in the form of premiums for flood 
insurance, subtracted by the compensation paid to property owners.
 
 Balance for entire pilot basin: Compensation from government in addition to 
compensation from insurance companies subtracted by property damages and 
premiums. The individual balances are aggregated for the entire pilot basin (all 
municipalities). 
 Balance for individual property owners: Compensation from government in 
addition to compensation from insurance companies subtracted by property damages 
and premiums. 
 Balance per municipality: Compensation from government in addition to 
compensation from insurance companies subtracted by property damages and 
premiums. The individual balances are aggregated per municipality. 
In this part, only the results concerning the entire basin, the insurance companies and 
the central government are presented. Full simulation results are provided in Appendix 
4.  
The results of the simulations of the different flood management strategies are 
described in terms of financial consequences. For readability, the results are aggregated 
according to the following distribution of outcomes. 
 
Number of outcomes 
8818
431
266
345
140
Total 10000
Table 2 
This means that the outcomes are collected in groups in descending order by the 
magnitude of losses. Thereafter, a weighted mean of the losses is calculated. This will 
be further explained in section 2.2.2.1 below. The total non-aggregated material is 
provided in Appendix 4. 
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2.2.1 Policy Scenario 1: Modified Current Scenario 
This scenario is a continuation of the current policy strategy in Hungary, where the 
government has the main economical responsibility. The assumptions for this scenario 
are the following: 
 The government compensates 60 per cent of property damages.  30 per cent of the households have private (bundled) property insurances (in which 
2 per cent of the total premium accounts for flood insurance).  Holders of private (bundled) insurance are compensated by 80 per cent by the 
insurance companies.  The insurance premium is not risk-based. It is based on the property value (2 per 
cent of the property value per year).
  
2.2.1.1 Governmental Load 
The costs for the government equal zero in most 10-year periods (in over 88% of the 
periods). No flood failures occurred during these decades. 
 
Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 0
0,0431 -9 372 425
0,0266 -122 222 481
0,0345 -227 255 130
0,0140 -794 509 286
Table 3 
However, out of 10 000 simulations, 431 times the costs were greater than zero, but less 
than 30 million HUF. In 266 cases the costs were between 100 and 150 million HUF. In 
345 cases the costs were between 200 and 450 million HUF, were the absolute majority 
of the outcomes approximated 210-230 million HUF. In 140 cases, the costs were 
between 800 and 1000 million HUF. See Appendix 4. The right column in Table 3 
denotes the weighted costs divided by the number of occurrences within each interval, 
i.e.,  
j ji i ii I i I
p c p∈ ∈∑ ∑ ,  
where pi is the number of occurrences of the cost ci, and Ij, j=1,…,5, are the respective 
index sets with 8818, 431, 266, 345 and 140 elements. 
2.2.1.2 Balance for Insurance Companies 
In the balance for the insurance companies, only premium incomes from the pilot basin 
are considered. Note that only 30 per cent of the property owners in this region have 
property insurances as compared to 60 per cent in Hungary in total. 
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Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 2 276 800
0,0431 -3 936 425
0,0266 -54 470 117
0,0345 -96 047 548
0,0140 -313 335 200
Table 4 
The simulations show that the insurance companies make a small profit in about 88% of 
the decades. This is because they receive flood premiums (2 per cent of the bundled 
property insurance premium). In decades with minor flood failures the balance is 
slightly negative; premiums are not sufficient to cover for compensations. In extreme 
decades the shortage is even larger, in 231 time-periods the deficit is greater than 100 
million HUF. In the 140 decades with most failures, the deficit amounts to over 300 
million HUF.  
2.2.1.3 Balance for Entire Pilot Basin 
The results for the individuals vary considerably; mostly depending on the location of 
the property. Below the balance for the property owners aggregated over the entire pilot 
basin is shown. 
 
Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 -2 276 800
0,0431 -17 932 566
0,0266 -230 715 672
0,0345 -434 214 423
0,0140 -1 540 519 800
Table 5 
In most decades the property owner pays premiums without retrieving any 
compensation, since no flood failure occurs. When a failure occurs, the property owner 
is compensated by the government by 60 per cent of damages, and is also compensated 
by the insurance company by 80 per cent of the damages. Because of this double 
compensation, some property owners gain economically if there is a flood failure. Since 
the premiums are based on the property value only, the risk of the location is not 
considered. This means that property owners with insurance in low-risk locations 
subsidise the premiums for those living in high-risk locations.  
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2.2.1.4 Summary Scenario 1 
1. The governmental load is extensive in this scenario, compensations to individual 
property owners are high, in extreme occasions up to 1000 millions HUF.  
2. Insurance companies in the pilot basin become insolvent when there is a flood 
failure. As only 30 per cent of the property owners are insured, the risk reserve is 
insufficient. 
3. Property owners with insurance perform very well. They are double compensated; 
i.e. they are (highly) compensated by the government as well as by the insurance 
companies. The premiums are not risk based, why a person in a high-risk area pays a 
subsidised premium. Some individuals in high-risk areas can gain economically from 
floods. 
4. The pilot basin balance is negative in all decades, since costs for premiums are paid. 
The costs in 140 cases were more than 1 500 million HUF. 
2.2.2 Policy Scenario 2: Private Based Insurances 
In this scenario, the responsibility is partly shifted from the government to the 
individual property owner. This is done by lowering the compensation from the 
government as well as the level of compensation from the subsidised property insurance 
(called insurance 1). Furthermore, an additional risk-based premium insurance 
(insurance 2) is introduced. The assumptions are the following: 
 The government compensates 30 per cent of property damages. 
 30 per cent of the households have a bundled insurance, in which 2 per cent of the 
total premium accounts for flood insurance. This is referred to as insurance 1. 
 Holders of insurance 1 are compensated by 40 per cent by the insurance companies. 
 The premium of insurance 1 is based on the property value (1 per cent of the 
property value per year). 
 Holders of risk-based insurance 2 are compensated by 100 per cent. 
 The premium of insurance 2 is risk-based. It is calculated from the expected 
damage per municipality, divided by the number of properties in the municipality. 
2.2.2.1 Governmental Load 
As in the previous scenario, no compensation is paid to the property owners 88% of the 
decades. In 431 decades the losses were around 4 million HUF. In 266 decades there 
compensations were about 61 million HUF, etc. The largest load for a decade was 514 
millions HUF, which, needless to say, is a considerably smaller load than in Scenario 1. 
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Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 0
0,0431 -4 686 212
0,0266 -61 111 241
0,0345 -113 627 565
0,0140 -397 254 643
Table 6 
2.2.2.2 Balance for Insurance Companies 
The insurance companies receive premiums from two different types of insurances; with 
subsidised premiums (30 per cent uptake rate in the pilot basin) and with risk-based 
premiums (5 per cent uptake rate), respectively. 
 
 
 
Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 2 469 598
0,0431 -4 074 660
0,0266 -31 356 868
0,0345 -57 104 532
0,0140 -212 081 938
Table 7 
The balance for the insurance companies is calculated from the income in form of 
premiums, both subsidised and risk-based, subtracted by expenditures in form of 
compensation. The resulting balance is positive in most decades. In the majority of 
simulations the balance is about 2.5 millions HUF. The insurance companies manage to 
stay solvent even for minor flood failures; this can be contributed to the risk-based 
insurance. When flood failures occur, the insurance companies pay less compensation 
than in Scenario 1. The reason for this is the low compensation level for the subsidised 
insurance 1, in combination with the low uptake rate for the risk-based insurance 2. The 
140 most severe losses exceeded 200 millions HUF.  
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2.2.2.3 Balance for Entire Pilot Basin 
A property owner, who has both subsidised insurance 1 and risk-based insurance 2, pays 
large premiums if the property is located in a high-risk area. Premiums for the region 
amount to almost 2.5 million HUF per decade. When floods occur there is 
compensation from insurance companies as well as from the government. However, the 
worst-case losses for the basin are severe. 
Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 -2 469 598
0,0431 -22 480 543
0,0266 -314 940 162
0,0345 -586 785 004
0,0140 -2 039 027 705
Table 8 
2.2.2.4 Summary Scenario 2 
1. The governmental load is substantially smaller than in Scenario 1. The largest loss is 
514 million HUF. The reason for this is that the compensation level is considerably 
lower. 
2. The pilot basin balance shows a more negative result, since risk-based premiums are 
expensive for the property owner. 
3. Insurance companies are showing a more balanced result than in Scenario 1. The 
incomes are a bit lower and the expenditures are smaller. The major shortage is 272 
million HUF. 
4. Since only 5% of the property owners are assumed to have risk based insurance, 
most of them are worse off than in Scenario 1,. Risk-based premiums are very 
expensive in two of the municipalities. However, when floods strike highly insured 
households, they receive high compensation. This is because risk-based insurance 
compensates to 100 per cent in addition to compensation from government and 
insurance 1. On the other hand, over the entire basin, the effects can be severe with a 
reasonably large probability of losses over 2 billions HUF. 
2.2.3 Policy Scenario 3: Mandatory Fee to Catastrophe Fund 
In this scenario, the government compensates flood failure victims from a catastrophe 
fund. However, it is mandatory for the property owners to pay a fee to that fund. The 
compensation for losses is 60 per cent. The fee is not risk-based and cross-subsidised in 
two ways: (i) property owners in high-risk locations are subsidised by property owners 
in low-risk locations (MUN 01), and (ii) low-income households are subsidised by the 
government who pays the fees (IIASA 99). The relatively low compensation is intended 
to stimulate property owners to take own mitigation precautions. If the catastrophe fund 
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runs out of money, the government reimburses the fund. The assumptions are the 
following: 
 The insurance companies are substituted by a governmentally controlled catastrophe 
fund.  A mandatory subsidised fee is introduced.   The yearly premium for the mandatory insurance is 1.5 per cent of property value.  The property owners receive 60% compensation.   The government subsidises insurance premiums (fees) for low-income households. 
60 per cent of the property owners in the pilot basin are considered to be low-income 
households.  No description of the balance for the insurance companies is included, since insurers 
are re-insured by the fund. 
2.2.3.1 Governmental Load 
The governmental load in Scenario 3 consists of the money that is transferred from the 
government to the fund when the balance of the fund is negative in addition to the 
premium subsidies for the low-income households. For low-income households, the 
government subsidises the premiums. 
The load of the government is in most cases 2.2 million HUF. This is the mandatory 
fee from the non-subsidised households (40% of the property owners) in the pilot basin. 
When the re-insurance fund is unable to cover the claims, the government reimburses 
these deficits. It occurs in 1182 of 10 000 simulations. However, when this occurs, the 
magnitude of the loss is at 751 occasions more than 100 millions HUF. In the 140 most 
extreme decades, the load ranged from -790 million HUF to over -1 billion HUF. 
 
Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 2 214 540
0,0431 -7 157 885
0,0266 -120 007 941
0,0345 -225 040 590
0,0140 -792 294 746
Table 9 
2.2.3.2 Balance for Entire Pilot Basin 
In most years, the loss for the basin is just over 2 million HUF. However, the balance 
for the basin can be severe, with a maximal loss of 2.4 billion HUF.  
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Probability Weighted loss 
0,8818 -2 214 540
0,0431 -24 083 531
0,0266 -287 400 329
0,0345 -532 476 511
0,0140 -1 856 069 540
Table 10 
Note that the balance never becomes positive. This is due to the low compensation level 
(60 per cent).  
2.2.3.3 Summary Scenario 3 
1. The balance for the catastrophe fund is rather positive during most decades.  
2. The costs for the government are higher than in the other scenarios, due to the cost 
for contribution to the fund, and aid to the low-income households. 
3. The insurance companies suffer no losses whatsoever. Neither, they gain anything in 
this scenario.  
4. The municipalities show a negative balance. The flood compensation is low. 
Furthermore, in the scenario there is no possibility for the individuals to buy extra 
insurance.  
3. DECISION ANALYSIS OF THE SCENARIOS 
Above, we have focused primarily on some quite general options for designing a public-
private insurance and re-insurance system for Hungary. As has been noted, this is a 
multi-criteria and multi-stakeholder problem. This section demonstrates a methodology 
for further investigating the scenarios from a decision analytical viewpoint.  
3.1 The EDM Method 
This section is a summary of the description of EDM in Appendix 5. The method used 
for evaluating the flood risk management policy decision problem in the Upper Tisza 
Basin (UTB) is based on the Delta method (Danielson 98). It has been further developed 
and extended to handle a model in which several stakeholders’ outcomes can be handled 
on a per consequence basis. Thus, it is a multi-criteria extension to the basic 
probabilistic method. Further, the use of multi-level trees in this context, previously 
only a theoretical possibility, has now been field-tested. 
In general, the EDM process is carried out in a number of steps. The first step is a bit 
special, since there is much information to collect. The initial information is gathered 
from different sources. Then it is formulated in statements and entered into the 
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computer tool. Following that, an iterative process commences, where step by step the 
decision-makers gain further insights. During this process, the decision-makers receive 
help in realizing which information is missing, is too vague, or is too precise. They 
might also change the problem structure by adding or removing consequences or even 
entire alternatives, as more information becomes available. 
In some cases, the first information collection phase can be a very long and tedious 
step. Sometimes, it might take man-months. In other cases, it might only require a few 
half-day discussions with experts. It is impossible to describe any typical case because 
the situations are too diverse. In the Upper Tisza Basin case, much work, ranging from 
interviews to simulation, was required. 
After the data collection phase, a modeling task commences where the decision-
maker structures and orders the information. Given the set of stakeholders, a smaller 
number of reasonable courses of action and identification of relevant consequences are 
compiled. In the UTB case, simulation results were clustered into meaningful sets. 
There is no requirement for the alternatives to have the same number of consequences. 
However, within any given alternative, it is required that the consequences are exclusive 
and exhaustive, i.e. whatever the result, it should be covered by the description of 
exactly one consequence. This is unproblematic, since a residual consequence can be 
added to take care of unspecified events. 
The probability and value statements plus the weights are represented by interval 
constraints and core intervals described later. Intervals are a natural form in which to 
express such imprecise statements. It is not required that the consequence sets are 
determined from the outset. A new consequence may be added at a later stage, thus 
facilitating an incremental style of working.  
3.1.1 Decision Frames 
In EDM, a decision problem is represented by a decision frame. The idea with such a 
frame is to collect all information necessary for the model in one structure. This 
structure is then filled in with user statements. All the probability statements in a 
decision problem share a common structure because they are all made relative to the 
same decision frame. They are translated and collected together in a probability base. 
For value statements, the same is done in a value base. Finally, stakeholder weights are 
also supplied.  
In practice, a model of the situation is created with stakeholders, relevant courses of 
action, and their consequences when specific events occur. A decision frame represents 
the model. The courses of action are called alternatives in the user model, and they are 
represented by consequence sets in the decision frame. Following the establishment of a 
decision frame in the tool, the probabilities of the events and the values of the 
consequences are subsequently filled in. A part of the user multi-level tree for UTB is 
shown in figure 3.1. For the first scenario, the three most likely outcomes are shown 
with their probability and value ranges. The last level contains the local weights of the 
stakeholders, as described below. 
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Figure 3.1: A multi-level tree for UTB 
A decision frame must capture the structure of the tree internally in the tool once 
transformed into one-level form. A one-level tree consists primarily of sets of 
consequences. Then, there are statements of probability and value collected in structures 
called constraint sets and cores.  
A collection of interval constraints concerning the same set of variables is called a 
constraint set. For such a system to be meaningful, there must exist some vector of 
variable assignments that simultaneously satisfies each inequality in the system. In other 
words, a consistent constraint set is a set where the constraints are at least not 
contradictory. 
The orthogonal hull is a concept that in each dimension signals which parts are 
definitely incompatible with the constraint set. The orthogonal hull can be pictured as 
the result of wrapping the smallest orthogonal hyper-cube around the constraint set. 
Constraints and core intervals have different roles in specifying a decision situation. 
The constraints represent “negative” information, which vectors are not part of the 
solution sets. The contents of constraints specify which ranges are infeasible by 
excluding them from the solutions. This is in contrast to core intervals, which represent 
“positive” information in the sense that the decision maker enters information about 
sub-intervals that are felt to be the most central ones and that no further discrimination 
is possible within those ranges.  
As for constraint sets, the core might not be meaningful in the sense that it may 
contain no possible variable assignments able to satisfy all the inequalities. This is quite 
similar to the concept of consistency for constraint sets, but for core intervals, the 
requirement is slightly different. It is required that the focal point is contained within the 
core. 
Together, constraint sets and cores delimit the shape of the belief in the numerical 
values for the variables, see figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: The hull, core and focal point for a variable 
3.1.2 Evaluations 
Which value does a particular decision have? The ultimate comparing rule of an 
evaluation in EDM as well as in many other methods is the expected value (EV), 
sometimes instantiated as the expected utility or the expected monetary value. For s 
stakeholders, this leads to the expression 
EV(Ai) = w1 (p1i1v1i1 + … + p1inv1in) + … + ws (psi1vsi1 + … + psinvsin), 
where wi, i=1,...,s, is the importance weight of stakeholder i. 
Fortunately, in the UTB case, the decision trees are symmetrical with respect to the 
stakeholders, i.e. the trees, the alternatives, the consequences, and thus the probabilities 
coincide. This leaves us with differing values and weights.  
When a rule for calculating the EV for decision frames containing interval 
statements is established, the next question is how to compare the courses of action 
using this rule. It is not a trivial task, since usually the possible EVs of several 
alternatives overlap. The most favorable assignments of numbers to variables for each 
alternative usually render that alternative the preferred one. The existence of more than 
one reasonable alternative means that for different consistent assignments of numbers to 
the probability and value variables, different courses of action are preferable. When this 
occurs, how is it possible to find out which alternative is to prefer? 
Let δ12 = EV(A1) – EV(A2) be the differences in expected value between the 
alternatives. If there are more than two alternatives, pairwise comparisons are carried 
out between all of them. It makes sense to evaluate the relative strength of A1 compared 
to A2 in addition to the strengths themselves, since such strength values would be 
compared to some other strengths anyway in order to rank the alternatives. The relative 
strength between the two alternatives A1 and A2 are calculated using the formula 
mid(δ12) = [max(δ12)+min(δ12)]/2 = [max(δ12) –max(δ21)]/2  
3.1.3 Cutting the Hull 
The hull cut is a generalized sensitivity analysis to be carried out in a large number of 
dimensions. In non-trivial decision situations, when a decision frame contains 
numerically imprecise information, the different principles suggested above are often 
too weak to yield a conclusive result by themselves. Only studying the differences in the 
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expected value for the complete bases often gives too little information about the mutual 
strengths of the alternatives.  
A natural way to continue is to consider values near the boundaries of the constraint 
intervals as being less reliable than the core due to the former being deliberately 
imprecise. If dominance is evaluated on a sequence of ever-smaller sub-bases, a good 
appreciation of the strength’s dependency on boundary values can be obtained. This is 
taken into account by cutting off the dominated regions indirectly using the hull cut 
operation. This is denoted cutting the bases, and the amount of cutting is indicated as a 
percentage β, which can range from 0% to 100%. For a 100% cut, if no core is 
specified, the bases are transformed into single points, and the evaluation becomes the 
calculation of the ordinary expected value. It is possible to regard the hull cut as an 
automated kind of sensitivity analysis. Since the belief in peripheral values is somewhat 
less, the interpretation of the cut is to zoom in on more believable values that are more 
centrally located.  
In Figure 3.3, the evaluation of the three UTB scenarios is shown as three pair wise 
comparisons between the alternatives respectively. The x-axis shows the cut in percent 
ranging from 0 to 100. The y-axis is the expected value difference δij for the pairs. The 
cone (which need not be linear if comparative statements are involved) consists of three 
lines. For comparing alternatives A1 and A2, the upper line is max(δ12), the middle is 
mid(δ12), and the lower is min(δ12). Thus, one can see from which cut level an 
alternative dominates weakly, markedly, and strongly. As the cut progresses, one of the 
alternatives eventually dominates strongly. The cut level necessary for that to occur 
shows the separability between the expected values. 
 
Figure 3.3: Evaluation of the UTB alternatives 
The selection procedure then continues with: 
(i) Remove all strongly dominated consequence sets 
(ii) If more than one consequence set remains 
 (ii a) Cut the frame until only one consequence set remains 
 (ii b) Remove the markedly dominated consequence sets 
 (ii c) A combination of (ii a) and (ii b) 
(iii) If only one consequence set remains 
 
(iii a) Uncut the frame until other consequence sets appear 
 (iii b) Study the markedly dominated consequence sets 
 (iii c) A combination of (iii a) and (iii b) 
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Before a new iteration starts, alternatives found to be undesirable or obviously inferior 
by other information could be removed from the decision process. Likewise, a new 
alternative can be added, should the information gathered indicate the need for it. 
Consequences in an alternative can be added or removed as necessary to reflect changes 
in the model. Often a number of cycles are necessary to produce an interesting and 
reliable result. 
3.2 ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS 
Taking the simulation results into account the scenarios are analysed with the decision 
theoretical tool described in Section 3.1. This analysis incorporates the various costs, 
criteria and probabilities involved. For the evaluation of the options, the aggregated data 
in the tables 2-10 have been used.1  
3.2.1 Modeling Impreciseness in Data 
Of great importance here is that the frequency of floods and levee failures used in the 
described simulations are based on historical data. That is, for instance, they do not 
reflect the flood increase during recent years. For a number of years, the flood peaks 
have constantly increased. This may be a result of the change in the land use, for 
instance forest cutting, urbanization, asphalting and other changes of land use, or it 
could be a result of global climate changes (CLC 01). Anyway, adequate and precise 
information is missing to a large extent in the kinds of simulation models described 
above. Therefore, in the analyses below, ranges of values have been used instead of the 
values from the simulations. The ranges are 40% intervals centred around the table 
values as mid-points. Needless to say, this is an arbitrary estimate, but the setting could 
easily be changed. 
3.2.1.1 Probability Estimates 
Table 11 shows the used values for the probabilities. These are based on the 
corresponding values of table 2. In the table, the left value is the minimum value for the 
probability, and the right value is the maximum value. It should be noted that the values 
are adjusted such that all values of the intervals are feasible modulo the laws of 
probability, i.e., there must exist some vector of variable assignments that 
simultaneously satisfies each statement in the system. 
 
                                                
1
 The same principles could have been applied to the non-aggregated data in Appendix 5, but the result 
would basically be the same. 
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Min 
probability 
Max 
probability 
0,858 0,906
0,034 0,052
0,021 0,032
0,028 0,041
0,011 0,017
Table 11 
3.2.1.2 Cost Estimates 
Table 12 shows the interval costs. These are based on the values of Tables 2-10 above. 
Also here, the left value under each category is the minimum value (80% of the 
simulated value) for the outcome, and the right value is the maximum value (120% of 
the simulated value) for the outcome. 
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Government   Insurers   Pilot basin  
Scenario 1        
0 0  1821440 2732160 -1821440 -2732160
-7497940 -11246910  -3149140 -4723710 -14346053 -21519079
-97777985 -146666977  -43576094 -65364141 -184572538 -276858807
-181804104 -272706157  -76838038 -115257057 -347371539 -521057308
-635607429 -953411143  -250668160 -376002240 -1232415840 -1848623760
        
Scenario 2        
0 0  1975678 2963518 -1975678 -2963518
-3748970 -5623455  -3259728 -4889591 -17984435 -26976652
-48888992 -73333489  -25085495 -37628242 -251952130 -377928194
-90902052 -136353078  -45683626 -68525439 -469428003 -704142005
-317803714 -476705571  -169665550 -254498325 -1631222164 -2446833246
        
Scenario 3        
1771632 2657448  0 0 -1771632 -2657448
-5726308 -8589462  0 0 -19266825 -28900237
-96006353 -144009529  0 0 -229920264 -344880395
-180032472 -270048709  0 0 -425981209 -638971813
-633835797 -950753695  0 0 -1484855632 -2227283448
Table 12 
3.2.2 Constructing the Decision Tree 
The decision tree is constructed from the three policy scenarios, which are considered as 
alternatives in the tree. Each of these alternatives has the same set of probability nodes, 
i.e., the five outcomes with the respective probabilities from Table 11. The final 
outcomes of the five nodes are divided into the three categories: Government, Insurance 
industry, and Pilot basin. Figure 3.4 shows a sub tree for Scenario 1. For completeness, 
Appendix 6 shows the entire tree including all scenarios. 
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Figure 3.4 
The values are mechanically entered into the tool, directly from the simulations. As was 
explained in Section 3.1, the weights of the stakeholders are modelled at the last level of 
the tree. The weights sum up to 1 for each of the probability nodes at the next-to-last 
level. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, the effects of manipulating the 
weights can then be easily analysed. 
3.2.3 Analysing the Scenarios 
The following analyses show the result of various evaluations of the decision situation. 
The following different assumptions have been tested: 
 All stakeholders are equally weighted. This shows that the choice is solely a matter 
of ranking the stakeholders’ relative importance. 
 Each of the stakeholders is assigned the weight 1. This clearly shows different 
stakeholder preferences among scenarios. 
 The government is considered to be more important than the municipalities.  
 The municipalities are considered to be more important than the government. 
The perspective of the insurance companies is not taken into account to a large extent in 
the analysis, even if this easily can be done. It was clear from the interviews (Appendix 
2) that a situation where these are considered of most importance would not be publicly 
acceptable. 
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3.2.3.1 Equal Weights 
It can be seen from Figure 3.5 that all scenarios are equal when the stakeholders receive 
the same weight, i.e., when all stakeholders are given the weight 1/3. An observation is 
therefore that to determine the preferred scenario, given the underlying data set, the 
choice of scenario is obviously a matter of determining the rank between the 
stakeholders. 
 
Figure 3.5 The stakeholders’ weights are equal 
3.2.3.2 Each Stakeholder Dominates 
The figures 3.6 to 3.8 below show the results of the situations, when each respective 
stakeholder has the weight 1.  
 
Figure 3.6 The weight of the government is 1 
It can be seen from Figure 3.6 that, from the governmental perspective, Scenario 2 is 
considerably better than the others. Scenario 3 is slightly better than Scenario 1. 
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Figure 3.7 The weight of the insurance companies is 1 
Figure 3.7 shows that, from the insurers perspective, Scenario 3 is considerably better 
than the others. Scenario 2 is clearly better than Scenario 1. 
 
Figure 3.8 The weight of the municipalities is 1 
Figure 3.8 shows that, from the perspective of the municipalities, Scenario 1 is better 
than the others. Scenario 3 is slightly better than Scenario 2. 
3.2.3.3 Ranking the Stakeholders 
Figure 3.9 shows the analysis when the weight of the government is greater than the 
weight of the municipalities. Both these weights are greater than the weight of the 
insurance companies. It can be seen from the figure that Scenario 2 is the most 
preferred, followed by Scenario 1. 
 
Figure 3.9 Weight of government greater than municipalities 
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Figure 3.10 shows the analysis when the weight of the municipalities is greater than the 
weight of the government. As in the previous analysis, both these weights are greater 
than the weight of the insurance companies. It can be seen from the figure that Scenario 
1 clearly is the most preferred, followed by Scenario 3. 
 
Figure 3.10 Weight of municipalities greater than government 
3.2.3.4 Conclusions 
The conclusions of these analyses, when only financial losses are taken into account, are 
the following: 
 The choice is a matter of ranking the stakeholders’ relative importance.  
 From a governmental perspective, Scenario 2 is preferred. 
 From the perspective of the insurance companies, Scenario 3 is preferred. 
 From the perspective of the municipalities, Scenario 1 is preferred. 
 When the government is considered to be more important than the municipalities, 
Scenario 2 is the most preferred option.  
 When the municipalities are considered to be of more importance than the 
government, Scenario 1 is the most preferred option. 
4. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
The seven semi-structured interviews were based on an interview protocol (Appendix 
1), and the respondents did receive this in advance. The protocol served as a base for the 
interviews and we also used a probing technique, whenever it was necessary in order to 
get out more information from the respondents. Each interview lasted between 2 and 3 
hours. The participants in the study where not randomly chosen. Instead the selection 
aimed at securing a broad spectrum of stakeholders.  
Strikingly, all local interviewees agreed that people should be able to stay in high-
risk areas, and there seems to be more agreement regarding the goals and assumptions 
than means to achieve these goals. Various reasons are mentioned, e.g., it is more cost-
effective than to move people. Furthermore, poor people cannot survive in more 
expensive areas and most of them have a low standard of education. In the Upper Tisza 
basin, people can survive on limited resources, e.g., there is no monthly cost for central 
heating, a cost that is mandatory for apartments in the cities. From the low income 
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perspective, people can have reasonable lives in the upper Tisza basin, which would not 
be possible in the cities.  
One of the locals said that, “otherwise the whole country should pay for their 
moving and this would probably be much more expensive”. A local also stressed the 
fact that if it would be possible for people to stay in a catastrophe-hit region, the system 
must take into account the indirect losses to the economy and jobs, not only the 
reconstruction of the dwellings. For example, in the recent Bereg case, when losses to 
agriculture and other businesses have not been compensated, it is very likely that people 
will not be able to maintain and operate their beautiful new houses – e.g., they will turn 
off the gas heating and heat with wood again, etc.  
Another local, however, said that there are areas, which must be given up for 
economic reasons. He also stated that there are limits to economic irrationality; for 
example, in an extreme case we are protecting 5 billion HUF value with a 30 billion 
HUF investment.  
Others also think that maybe this area cannot maintain all these people, but most 
agree that the issue of regional development should be separated (at least politically) 
from the catastrophe management and compensation issue.  
 
Assumption 1: All locals emphasize that this is a very poor and backward area. Most 
people cannot recover without help. If their homes are washed away, most need 100% 
compensation.  
 
Assumption 2: All locals think that the government has to take responsibility for 
catastrophes occurring as a result of failure in the primary defence lines. This is because 
the state has full responsibility in maintaining these lines. Some think that this 
responsibility should be 100%.  
 
Assumption 3: Mitigation is more cost-effective than loss sharing. The flood risk can 
and should be decreased (The so called “New Vasarhely iterv” which is currently 
planned, will reduce the risk significantly. Its estimated cost would amount about less 
that 100 billion HUF. Implementing this plan is certainly more cost-effective that 
paying insurance premiums). 
 
Tools: For the above reasons, tools of solidarity are much more emphasized than 
market-based elements. 
 
All interviewees agree that the recent system has problem, in particular, its 
unpredictable nature disturbs people. For example, an official of the national disaster 
management authority said that after the 2001 flood, the government compensated all 
property owners, even the households who had private flood insurance. When floods 
happened earlier (1999 and 2000), the governmental compensation-procedure looked 
different, because the insurance compensation was then deducted from what was 
compensated by the government. However, the last flood was considered to be the 
responsibility of the government, as it was a primary levee that burst (earlier this was 
not the case). Furthermore, political considerations were made – if the governmental 
compensation was reduced this time, nobody would buy private flood insurance in the 
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future. Furthermore, some people criticize the fact that people can make money from a 
catastrophe.  
An officer of the regional water management authority gave an example on the latter 
and said that it is not desirable that people get more than 100% compensation in total. 
He added that this is a problem with Scenario 1 – because those who have insurance can 
receive more than 100%. In an extreme case, they can damage their houses – as it really 
happened in 2001. 
Insurance is preferred by locals in the Scenario 3 non-profit, cross-subsidised form 
(which is regarded as a “government insurance” or a catastrophe tax). The idea of a 
catastrophe fund (similar to the concept of national pool, proposed by (Mitchell 01)), 
which cannot be used for other purposes, is also supported by most interviewees. (Note 
that there was such a fund earlier, but the government wanted “free hands” to use it. 
Therefore, all separated funds were merged in the budget. Separate funds are in 
contradiction with current centralizing tendencies).  
Thus, locals mainly support cross-subsidised premiums, in contrast to the 
representative of the insurance industry who strongly supports risk-based premiums. 
However, some would add risk-based premiums for property owners who want to 
receive more compensation (e.g., the more affluent), or those having summer houses, 
etc. Furthermore, all locals agree that the government should pay – or at least contribute 
to - the premiums for people who are poor and cannot pay them by themselves. There 
are some who claim that the government should pay – or contribute to – the premiums 
for all properties which are located in high-risk regions.  
Mandatory insurance seems to be supported by most locals, but the representative of 
the insurance industry is very much against it and thinks that it is infeasible. The 
representative of the Association of Hungarian Insurers, said for instance that, 
“Mandatory insurance raises bad memories in Hungary – people do not like things that 
are mandatory”.  
Most locals think that in case of a large disaster, compensation – paid by the 
government or by the catastrophe fund - should be 100%. There is one person who 
would decrease the compensation and add elements, which should encourage people to 
move. Such elements would be either interest-free loans, or risk-based insurance - a 
version of Scenario 2. (Note that both would work only for people who are not poor). 
One of the local mayors mentioned for instance that once when there was a flood, only 
100 persons, (out of 1600 persons in the village, and out of 900 in active age), received 
the loans. The reason was that a term for the loan was that people must have been 
employed for at least a year. Consequently, the poor would not move anyway – they 
should be compensated, or their risk-based premiums should be paid.  
Most locals do not have strong feelings about government reinsurance, although 
some are strongly against it (assumption: insurance companies can buy it on the 
international market). The representative of the insurance industry strongly supports it. 
The information below (figures regarding the last flood in the upper Bereg basin) 
provides us with real data which is valuable when evaluating different insurance 
scenarios and different ways of compensating losses. The following data are based on 
the interview with an official of the national disaster management authority:  
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The reconstruction costs were initially estimated to 25.000 HUF/m2; this figure was 
finally adjusted upwards to 100.000 HUF/m2. The first estimate of the damages in the 
Bereg basin was that the direct losses (private households only) summed up to 5 billion 
HUF (direct losses). Finally, the losses were estimated to 15 billion HUF (this is what 
government paid, plus insurance companies paid 2,8 billion HUF. The large difference 
shows that government compensation may have been too generous). If buildings 
belonging to the central government, crop damages, damages in public infrastructure, 
etc. are included, the total losses sum up to 50 billion HUF. 
There are, however three explanations to why the initial estimation of the losses was 
much lower than the final figures. 
1. The damages of adobe houses are revealed in different time steps; direct damages 
appear immediately after the flood. Secondary damages appear when the house 
dries up; these can be cracks in the walls etc. 
2. People who made the first estimates were not real experts. If insurance companies 
had made it, estimates would have been much closer to real costs. In addition, first 
estimates were made at the time of flood protection. 
3. Reconstruction costs were much larger than what was originally expected. A 
consortium consisting of five construction companies was assigned the task of 
reconstructing the damaged houses.  
 
The government offered following compensation alternatives after the last flood (Bereg 
basin): 
1. The property owner receives a new house in the same location, built in a material 
better suited to stand future floods (concrete house, standing on a 1,5 meter high 
foundation – this flood was about 1 meter high). Applied for: Severely damaged 
houses (destroyed). 
2. The house is renovated on the expense of the government. Applied for: Moderately 
damaged houses. 
3. The property owners could choose to leave the basin and buy a house of similar 
standard in other municipalities (but only within the county), with less flood risk. 
The old damaged house was then taken down. The government paid for the new 
house, controls were made to assure that the new house was of similar standard etc. 
Applied for: Severely damaged houses (destroyed) and for moderately damaged 
houses. 
4. The property owners were given cash economic compensation; the size of the 
compensation handed out was lower than renovation costs for the house (25 000 
HUF/m2 for adobe house, 50 000 HUF/m2 for non-adobe house).  
5. One restriction that was introduced was that people who received new houses must 
not sell them for 15 years. 
Since 206 people bought other houses, demand and real estate prices went up. 
(However, the market value of the new houses is still about the half of the 
reconstruction costs.) People have to spend much more money for the utility fees in 
these large, new houses (e.g., gas central heating, closed septic tanks – technically better 
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solutions, but expensive). The property owners with damaged houses made the 
following choices (based on 98 % of the households): 
 766 house owners received a new house on the same location 
 1719 house owners had their homes renovated 
 206 house owners choose to move out 
 183 house owners received cash economical compensation 
 
Regarding the insurance options, according to the interviewee the third scenario is 
preferred, but without making the fee mandatory (since this would be infeasible 
anyway, he said). The government should help to make insurance more attractive (for 
example, insurance fees could be deducted from tax). It would be desirable that more 
people have insurance. Currently, insurance companies pay 1% of their profit (1,5 
billion HUF in total) to the government. This money is used for fire protection 
purposes. Such system could be extended to natural catastrophes. Catastrophe funds 
would be a good idea. It has existed before. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on earlier interviews performed in the Palad-Csecsei basin (Vari 01, 01b), this 
report discusses three alternative flood management policy strategies. We have 
investigated the effects of imposing these for the purpose of illuminating significant 
effects of adopting different insurance policies. The main focus has been on insurance 
schemes in combination with level of governmental compensation. 
The analyses of the different policy strategies have been based on a model where the 
flood failures are simulated and where geographical, hydrological, social, and 
institutional data have been taken into account. The generated results are thereafter 
automatically transposed to decision trees under three stakeholder perspectives. Thus, 
taking the simulation results into account, the scenarios have been analysed with a 
decision theoretical tool for evaluating the various costs, criteria and probabilities 
involved. 
However, of great importance here is that the frequency of floods and levee failures 
used in the described simulations are based on historical data and does not, for instance, 
reflect recent years increase of flood peaks. In general, these kinds of simulations, 
dependent of quite a large number of input data, are also very sensitive to various types 
of errors. Consequently, there seem to be significant reasons for discriminating between 
measurable and immeasurable uncertainty in this context. Since an actual and precise 
uncertainty measure is lacking, the simulations have been used merely as a basis for a 
more elaborate sensitivity analysis, considering both probabilities for floods and the 
estimates of losses. 
We have also, to some extent, validated the approaches using stakeholder 
interviews. A main issue is that all local interviewees think that people should be able to 
stay in high-risk areas, and there seems to be more agreement regarding goals and 
assumptions than means to achieve these goals. This motivated the entire scenario 
construction approach. Furthermore, it was emphasized that tools of solidarity are much 
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more emphasized than market-based elements. This was the motivation in selecting the 
criteria for the analyses. 
It should be noted that we have refrained from making any definite conclusions as to 
which of the three policy scenarios is the best; the preferences concerning level of 
solidarity/private responsibility is the single most important perspective that affect this 
choice. 
In the next phase, a stakeholder workshop will be conducted where the stakeholders 
can debate and promote the different policy strategies. The stakeholder workshop will 
take place during September 2002. Other activities within the research project are also 
to scale up the results of the pilot basin to the entire county. More policy strategies are 
being identified and implemented, for instance re-naturalization by taking down 
sections of the levee upstream the villages. This step is quite controversial, since much 
arable land would be sacrificed to save the villages. It can also be seen as a more 
holistic flood management strategy; floods are really a natural part of the riverine 
system. 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
TISZA River Interview Guide 
 
OPTIONAL INTRO: The project “Flood Risk Management Policy in the Upper Tisza 
Basin: A System Analytical Approach” is an international research project with 
collaborators from Austria, Hungary, and Sweden. The project is funded by the 
Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial 
Planning. The research project is aimed at understanding the flood risk management 
problem in the Upper Tisza region. 
 
The background information for this study is provided in the attached documents and 
the suggested decision trees for choosing insurance policies and mitigation measures 
are also provided. 
 
We would like to take this opportunity to point out that all your responses will be 
treated in the strictest confidence. None of your responses will be directly attributed to 
you or to your institution. 
 
A.  PROLOGUE 
1) Which flood related areas do you deal with, or responsible for?  
 
2) How did you get to be in this position? 
- Academic/professional background 
- Career path 
B. IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT AGENTS 
1) What is your view on how flood insurance and mitigation policies should be 
handled? 
- The flood-fighting approaches should focus on "top-down" decision-making 
- The success of future mitigation strategies will depend on putting some control 
in the hands of the communities.  
- Other 
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2) Please rank the following with respect to responsibility for compensating flood 
losses. 
- The Hungarian government 
- The local/municipal governments 
- Property owners 
- The upstream countries 
- Insurance companies 
- Other 
 
3) Who are the most important actors to involve when formulating and 
implementing insurance and mitigation policies? Rank the following with 
respect to importance. 
- State actors (ministries, civil servants, executive agencies, etc.) 
- Political actors (ministers, advisers, spokespersons of political parties) 
- Interest representation and NGOs (environmental groups, specialised interest 
groups, etc.) 
- Private sector actors (insurance companies, banks, firms, etc.) 
- Research actors (universities, think-tanks, research organisations, etc.) 
- Property owners 
- Others 
 
4) In general, who do you consider to be the most trustworthy for evaluating flood 
losses and mitigation measures? Rank the following. 
- Experts of water management 
- Experts of municipal governments  
- Experts of the Hungarian government 
- University teachers and researchers 
- Experts of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
- Experts of international intergovernmental organizations (e.g., E.U.) 
- NGOs and environmental group experts 
- Other 
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C. INSURANCE POLICIES 
C1. CONSEQUENCE STRUCTURE 
1) Demonstration and discussion of a tentative decision tree with probability and 
value estimates. 
 
2) In the document provided, a consequence tree is suggested. Please modify this 
tree according to your perception of events that may occur as consequences of 
major floods. You may want to consider categories like the following. 
 
- Roads, utilities, and public buildings are damaged 
- Farming activities become impossible 
- Homes, summer houses are damaged 
- The income from farming activities becomes highly uncertain  
- People get distressed, and often become ill  
- Property values decrease in the endangered areas 
- Strain on families removed from their home environments 
- Altered social relationships 
- Personal vulnerability and loss of control 
- Other 
C2. VALUE ESTIMATION 
1) Please estimate the consequences in the finalised tree with respect to values. If 
possible, try to estimate the values precisely, in intervals, or by just ordering 
them. You may want to consider categories like the following. 
 
- Distribution of costs, i.e., the risk groups pay for their costs vs. taxpayers in low-
risk areas subsidise those in high-risk areas 
- The possibility that large groups cannot afford to pay insurance premiums 
- Separate treatment of owners of vacation homes or well-to-do businesses 
- Less consideration of victims who have built their homes in high-risk areas 
without a permit 
- Encouragement of neighbors and others to help one another 
- Villages should be protected at all costs 
- Insurance companies may go bankrupt after a very serious flood 
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2) Could you see any activities that reduce the severity of the consequences? If 
this is the case, how does it affect the decision tree? You may want to consider 
categories like the following. 
 
- Take into consideration particularly vulnerable groups 
- Take into consideration critical aquatic life and wildlife habitat vulnerable to 
damage from flooding 
- Consideration of options to protect better the basin from contaminants during 
future floods 
- Consideration of options to protect critical habitat  
- Conversion of marginal agricultural land of the floodplain into a greenway, 
park, forest preserve or other use not subject to much damage  
- Tightening zoning ordinances to restrict the kinds of development permitted in 
flood-prone areas.  
- Information available to individuals, government, and non-government 
organizations and others gathered and made available at a central basin-wide 
archive or archives  
- Possible compensation for villagers choosing to relocate 
- Low-income persons are assisted in purchasing insurance 
- Property owners taking more responsibility 
- Insurance companies assisting governments in building flood defences 
- Insurance companies might not insure poor persons living in very high risk 
areas 
- Insurance companies might not insure all flood risks 
- Insurers charge the same insurance premium for people living in low-risk areas 
C3. PROBABILITY ESTIMATION 
1) Please estimate the consequences in the finalised tree with respect to 
probabilities. If possible, try to estimate the values precisely or by using 
intervals. 
 
2) Could you see any activities that change the probabilities of the consequences? 
If this is the case, how do they affect the tree? You may want to consider 
categories like the following. 
 
- Developing or improving arrangements for warning of imminent flooding 
- Developing or improving flood preparedness plans 
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- Working with governmental or local agencies to provide or improve structural 
protection for the area 
- Providing technical and/or financial assistance to property owners in flood 
proofing or otherwise protecting their property against flooding 
- Establish sufficient information centres prior to and during a flood event 
- Better organised decision management at central and local governments 
 
D. MITIGATION MEASURES 
D1. CONSEQUENCE STRUCTURE 
1) Demonstration and discussion of a tentative decision tree with probability and 
value estimates. 
2) In the document provided, a consequence tree is suggested. Please modify the 
tree according to your perception of events that may occur as consequences of 
major floods. You may want to consider categories like the following. 
 
- Roads, utilities, and public buildings are damaged 
- Farming activities become impossible 
- Homes, summer houses are damaged 
- The income from farming activities becomes highly uncertain  
- People get distressed, and often become ill  
- Property values decrease in the endangered areas 
- Pollution is spread by flood waters 
- Drinking water reserves become polluted 
- Tourism is decreased 
- The ecosystem becomes unbalanced or damaged 
- Wildlife and vegetation is damaged 
- Strain on families removed from their home environments 
- Altered social relationships 
- Personal vulnerability and loss of control 
- Other 
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D2. VALUE ESTIMATION 
1) Please estimate the consequences in the finalised tree with respect to values. If 
possible, try to estimate the values precisely, in intervals, or by just ordering 
them. You may want to consider categories like the following. 
- Distribution of costs, i.e., the risk groups pay for their costs vs. solidarity: 
taxpayers in low-risk areas to support those in high-risk areas 
- Large groups cannot afford to pay insurance premiums 
- Separate treatment of owners of vacation homes or well-to-do businesses 
- Special consideration of victims who have built their homes in high-risk areas 
without a permit 
- Encouragement for neighbours and others to help one another 
- Villages should be protected at all costs 
- Insurance companies may go bankrupt after a very serious flood 
- Other 
2) Could you see any activities that reduce the severity of the consequences? If 
this is the case, how does it affect the tree? You may want to consider categories 
like the following. 
 
- Compensation for villagers choosing to relocate 
- Low-income persons are assisted in purchasing insurance 
- Each jurisdiction with responsibilities for evacuation within the basin 
establishes an evacuation protocol within its emergency operation plan 
- Clarity and public dissemination of the protocols to help prevent confusion at 
the time of evacuation 
- Plans take into consideration the specific requirements of vulnerable groups, 
such as nursing home residents 
D3. PROBABILITY ESTIMATION 
1) Estimate the consequences in the finalised tree with respect to probabilities. If 
possible, try to estimate their values precisely or by in intervals. 
2) Could you see any activities that change the probabilities of the consequences? 
If this is the case, how does it affect the tree? 
 
Thank the respondent and Close 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEWS 
 
Officer of the Upper Tisza Reginal Water Authority 
26 February, 2002 
 
Goal/1: We do not want that people make a profit from a catastrophe. This means that it 
is not desirable that people get more than 100% compensation in total. This is a problem 
with Scenario 1 – because those who have insurance can receive more than 100%. In an 
extreme case they can damage their houses  - as it really happened in 2001. 
Goal/2: We want to keep people in risky areas. Otherwise the whole country would 
have to pay for them moving and this would probably be much more expensive. 
Therefore, we have to help people in high-risk areas to recover after major floods. 
Goal/3: The overall risk should be decreased. Houses should be built in safer locations, 
with better technologies. 
Considering the above goals, Scenarios 1 and 3 both have large solidarity elements, 
while Scenario 2 is more market oriented and it would lead to an outmigration from 
high-risk areas (because of less than 100% compensation and high risk-based premia). 
Scenario 3 is somewhat better than the other because 100% compensation can be 
assured, and in addition, damages do not have to be estimated and paid via two 
channels, insurance experts can be used to estimate the damages. 
At the same time, mechanisms are needed that would make people interested in 
decreasing the damages. For example, building permits should not be issued for deep 
areas which are frequently flood by seepage from river or standing water from 
precipitation. Another solution: existing houses demolished and people moved to 
“social” apartments. This happens in Belgium.  
To reach the above goals, the interviewee combined the various scenarios and proposed 
the following two alternative policies: 
A. Modified version of Scenario 3: Mandatory insurance, with less than 100% 
compensation, and government support to the poor by paying the premia. To start all 
over in case of a large catastrophe an interest-free loan is offered. It can be used to build 
new houses in less risky locations with more advanced technologies. 
B. Modified version of Scenario 2: Three pillars where the first two pillars add up to 
100%, plus risk-based insurance can be bought as well. The poors get their premia paid 
by the government. 
The interviewee suggested that discharge data for the 100 years and 1000 years flood 
should be considered with caution because they are very uncertain. Sensitivity analysis 
were proposed where both discharge and probability data could be manipulated. 
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Mayor of  a city in the Bereg region 
February 27, 2002 
 
Scenario 1: It is basically OK. Protecting the people from flood is the responsibility of 
the government. Therefore he thinks that 100% government compensation in case of a 
dyke failure is fair and it is government responsibility. In addition, people who have 
insurance should be compensated by the insurance companies. In previous years, 
insurance was deducted from the government compensation, but this sent a wrong 
message to those who insured their homes. 
 
He talked about the anomalies of the property values – the market values of the old 
houses were about 1-2 MFt, but if the government had paid this amount, people would 
not have been able to rebuild their houses. New houses were built for 8-10 MFt, but if 
somebody would like to sell them, they would be worth  3-4 MFt. Differences are less 
in the city, but larger in the small settlements. 
 
Scenario 2: Government has either to guarantee 100% compensation, or help paying 
insurance premia to the insurance companies on behalf of the inhabitants of the high-
risk regions. But he cannot support the option where government pays premia for 
households in low-risk areas. According to him the government should pay (fully or 
partially) the premia for people living in high-risk regions, because government is 
responsible for protecting such areas. (NOTE: This makes sense only if premia are risk-
based, otherwise people living in low-risk areas have to pay more than people living in 
high-risk areas, which is nonsense!) 
 
He also spoke about the premia received by insurance companies. For AEGON (the 
largest insurer) the yearly total premia in the Bereg region is 200 MFt. In 2001 they had 
to pay 1,5 billion Ft for the damages which occured in Bereg.  In January 2002 they 
started to pull out, and cancelled the flood-insurance from 12 000 contracts in the Upper 
and Mid-Tisza flood basins. (The other six companies operating in the region paid 1,3 
billion Ft in total in 2001. Most of them are willing to offer flood-coverage, although 
with some restrictions, e.g., some companies do not want to cover adobe houses which 
have no foundations). 
 
He concluded that mitigation is cheaper than loss sharing. The so called „New 
Vasarhelyi-terv” which is currently planned, will reduce the risk significantly, and its 
estimated cost would amount to less than 100 billion Ft. Implementing this plan is 
certainly more cost-effective than paying insurance premia  
Scenario 3: He could support scenario 3 if Government paid premia in high-risk regions 
(see above), and if some of the risk was taken by the insurance companies – like in the 
French system, but he does not think that government reinsurance would be necessary, 
because small companies can find reinsurance at large companies. 
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Mayor of a village in the Szatmar area 
27 February, 2002 
 
The heavy metal pollution that occurred only weeks after the cyanide spill, does still 
have large impact on the tourism industry in the region. The water tourism (boating, 
canoeing, etc.) still visits the area, but the stays are shorter then before. Elderly people 
used to spend the entire summer there, but this doesn’t happen any longer. The amount 
of fish has been affected; even tough this part of the river was not contaminated by the 
cyanide spill. The heavy metal spill, that did pollute this part of the river, did not kill the 
fish. As the fish was reduced upstream, in the Samos tributary, many anglers and fishers 
moved to this part of the river instead. Fish implantations were not made in this part of 
the river. 
 
Scenario three seemed interesting according to the interviewee, but he identified a 
number of potential problems: 
1. Some people can benefit from the floods, by getting new houses from the 
government. The system must assure that the compensation is limited so no 
overcompensation can happen. If a new house is built it should have a standard 
similar to the old one.  
2. Even the 40 per cent that are not considered ‘low-income household’ could need 
subsidised premiums.  He did not think that private responsibility needed to be 
encouraged. Households should pay according to their economical situation, but 
still take responsibility. 
 
Insurance Companies 
The insurer (Aegon) that pulled back recently did only have a number of contracts in the 
region. The other insurers (3) are still active in the region. The price of the premiums 
depends on the material of the house (concrete, wood, clay, etc.). The location of the 
building does not make any difference in the size of the premium, they are not risk-
differentiating within the Tisza river basin. In general, adobe houses are three times as 
expensive to insure as concrete houses. Adobe houses are old-fashioned and built by 
clay-bricks.  
 
Interest-free Loans  
Out of 1600 persons in the village (900 in active age), only 100 received the loans, one 
term for the loan is to have been employed for at least one year.  
 
Re-location 
Many of the people are low-educated, which would make the re-location alternative 
very costly, as it would lead to unemployment. In this Upper Tisza basin, people can 
live and survive on very little  money. There is no monthly cost for central heating for 
instance, a cost that is connected with apartments in the cities. From the low incomes, 
40 
people can lead reasonable lives in the upper Tisza basin, which would not be possible 
in the cities.   
 
Unemployment 
Neither tourism nor agriculture is enough for anybody to live on.  
 
Tourism 
The tourist-season only lasts two months a year: Some restaurant-owners try to survive 
the rest of the year by preparing food for schools and companies, but it is difficult. They 
cannot afford to renovate the their buildings.  
 
Agriculture 
The production in this area is not high, but it is not very low either. Especially the fruit 
production is quite reasonable. The problem is that the farmers are unable to sell their 
fruit and vegetables since they don’t cooperate with any larger chains. The distribution-
channels are still under-developed, which leads to those large amounts of fruit and 
vegetable rot that cannot be sold to the cities. Due to distribution problems and 
uncertainties regarding the price-levels for different crops, many farmers choose not to 
cultivate their land or to recreate the live-stocks (?). 
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Director of a regional Environmental NGO 
February 28, 2002 
 
 
Goal: People should not leave the area, but of course, there are areas which must be 
given up for economic reasons. There are limits to economic irrationality, for example, 
in an extreme case we are protecting 5 billion Ft value with a 30 billion Ft investment. 
 
Scenario 1: The most important is to change the current system. There are a lot of 
uncertainties in the current system. The insurance system is problematic as well, but 
government compensation is even more problematic because it is completely 
unpredictable. Another problem is that buildings are strongly under-insured. 
 
Scenario 2: Government has to play a role, because people cannot pay high risk-based 
insurance premia in the high-risk regions.  
 
Scenario 3: Cat-fund is a good idea, but it should not be operated by a government 
authority. I do not prefer large government bureaucracies, rather a profit-oriented 
organization should operate it. Certainly these funds should not be located in a ministry.  
 
If the insurance companies run the system, it will be more effective – private business is 
more profit-oriented and rational, chance of corruption is much smaller than in the 
government sector. 
 
Mandatory insurance is problematic, people would not be willing to pay it. Cat-fund is a 
good idea, but I do not see how it could be collected. It could be collected as a tax, but I 
am not sure that there will be a political will for this. Another option would be to get 
insurance companies to collect it. For people who cannot pay premia, the government 
should pay them.  
 
This would be a good business for the insurance companies, therefore their duties 
should be much more clearly regulated. Insurance should pay for seepage, standing 
water, etc. if it is related to riverine floods. And this system would be good for the 
government because they could get rid of the risk. 
 
On the other hand, regulations should guarantee that houses are built with appropriate 
technologies, so they wouldn´t get to damaged. Regulation and control should be more 
stringent. Authorities can do a lot, but individuals cannot do much to decrease the 
losses. 
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This system should first be built up for private residences, but later they should be 
extended for community properties, and also private businesses (jobs are erased by the 
flood!). 
 
Recently premia were raised severely. In the Upper Tisza they doubled. But still, it is 
crucial that buildings should not be under-insured. If they are under-insured, it is 
impossible to reconstruct the buildings from the compensation. Risk-based premia 
would be too high for the people, but if the govt. has to pay it, that is efficient, because 
they have to decide if they should pay higher premia, or protect the region. 
 
Risk-based premia should be applied on the level of settlements, then people would 
move to higher points. But the reality is that people cannot leave the whole Bereg area 
behind. 
 
If people cannot pay the high risk-based premia in high-risk areas, they would move, 
but this is not necessarily good. He would not propose to young people not to move 
there, because then only the old and the Roma population would stay there, because 
they cannot sell their houses, or if they could sell them, they would not get much out of 
it. The situation would get worse and worse. 
 
However, there should – and will – be major changes. Soil is not good for agricultural 
production. Also, the EU accession means that less land will be used for agricultural 
production. Agro-land could be reduced and wetland be created. This would be good for 
mitigation.  
 
150 years ago it was possible to pass a long area by canoeing on the streams, not only 
on the Tisza. There was a large wetland there. In the Hortobagy National Park, there are 
large areas which can be turned into wetlands. In these large unpopulated areas it is 
easier than in the Upper Tisza region where there are many small settlements near the 
river. When deciding about renaturalization, many factors have to be taken into 
consideration. 
 
Advantages of complex land-use: not only ecological, but also economical. Intensive 
production 100 000 Ft/ha, complex use: 4-500 000 Ft/ha estimated income!! But 
changes from intensive use to complex land-use will be slow and gradual. 
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Representative of the Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County Chamber of Agriculture 
February 28, 2002 
 
 
Goal: The system should make it possible to people in a catastrophe-hit region to be 
able to recover. If people are not able to start all over again – especially in a case of a 
large damage concentrated to one region - then life there will be impossible. Moreover, 
it is not only the dwellings that should be important, because there are indirect losses  to 
economy and jobs, these should also get reconstructed. For example, in the recent Bereg 
case, where losses to agriculture and other businesses have not been compensated, it is 
very likely that people will not be able to maintain and operate their beautiful new 
houses – e.g., they will turn off the gas heating and heat with wood again, etc. 
 
Scenario 3 preferred. Proposed change: 100% compensation – indirect losses are still a 
severe load on the communities. The reason for this proposal is the poor situation, the 
high level of unemployment, and the bad quality of land in this county. Therefore, 
people do not have sufficient reserves, and in case of a catastrophe they cannot recover 
without external help.  
 
The cat-fund is a good solution. The organization which handles the cat-fund should 
work on a non-profit basis. The government should pay at least 90-95% to the insureds 
that are poor. Such a fund should have been created a long time ago. 
 
What kind of premia? He does not agree with risk-based premia, he would support 
cross-financing. If such a catastrophe-insurance is mandatory, it is like a property-tax. 
For poor people this tax is waived, or paid by the government. And it should be broader 
than just flood, it should cover various catastrophes. But the fund covers only homes, 
not summer houses (these should be insured on the private insurance market). 
  
Reinsurance by government: AEGON would like government reinsurance because they 
have problems on the international reinsurance market. He has no opinion on this issue. 
 
Q: But should people be encouraged by the compensation to stay here and build homes 
over and over again?  
 
R: If we want people to leave that should not be tied with decisions on compensation. 
These two issues should be kept separated. Regional development decisions should be 
made by the government for long-term, and it should be decided what kind of activities 
should be encouraged, and how many people should stay. For example, there is an 
increasing emphasis on multi-functional land-use, e.g., maintenance of pastures, forests, 
wetlands, recreation, as opposed to production by itself. The question is how many 
people should be involved in these activities, how should they be compensated for the 
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decreased production, where should the others go? And if we want that some of them 
leave, they should receive some funding for this. In case of floods, they should be able 
to receive money as compensation and move. Young people have started to move 
anyway. 
 
The Socialist Party's program includes the idea of a catastrophe fund and that this 
concept should be developed. They are also working on a fund that should cover 
agricultural losses. Recently this is uninsurable loss (agricultural flood-loss). 
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Representative of the Association of Hungarian Insurers 
March 1, 2002 
 
 
Recent events: AEGON is pulling out from flood insurance in the risky area. The main 
reason for this is the difficulty of finding reinsurance for catastrophe risks. Other 8 
companies are replacing AEGON which for the time being have no such problems (they 
have less contracts in the property insurance field). 
 
Evaluation of the various solutions:  
 
Scenario 1: If business as usual continues, other insurance companies will be likely to 
pull out. To prevent these, premia have to be raised significantly in high-risk areas. 
 
Scenario 2: Risk-based insurance is a good idea, he would like to see it more. In high-
risk areas premia could be one magnitude higher than now, the government should pay 
the difference between cross-financed premia and risk-based premia for the insurers. 
(This could mean in an extreme case that government pays 100% of flood insurance 
premia for all people living in high-risk areas which is financially equivalent with 100% 
compensation after floods). 
 
Scenario 3: Mandatory insurance raises bad memories in Hungary – people do not like 
things that are mandatory. This kind of mandatory insurance does not exist in Europe – 
except for France. 
 
Cat-fund would be a good idea, but he assumes that it will be accumulated from 
insurance taxes (3-4-5%), which have been proposed already three times. (The 
interviewee talked about insurance tax, a top-tax that is added on top of the premia.) 
This would not be fair because people who have already insured themselves would need 
to pay additional tax i.e., payments will be distributed among the insured rather than 
among all taxpayers. This may also make many people to cancel their insurance . 
 
The amount of compensation paid to clients is always the reconstruction cost. If a low-
standard house, an adobe house for instance, is destroyed, then it is compensated by a 
house of the same size but of a higher standard. This explains why the compensation is 
larger than the original property value of the house. 
 
Under-insured houses are only compensated to certain per cent of it reconstruction cost. 
Wether a house is under-insured or not, if yes to what degree, is based on how large the 
coverage is, the insurance companies have records on the property values for all clients. 
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The cost for rebuilding of houses (from last flood of 2001) was 10 – 12 million HUF, 
but the market value of the new houses was only 5 – 6 million HUF. 
 
Insurance contracts for adobe houses were cancelled from January 1st. This was said to 
have happened to 10 000 households. The government intervened with OTP and 
ordered them to offer flood insurance. The OTP wanted to keep the customers but get 
rid of the flood insurance. 
 
Important info: There are about 7 million property insurance contracts in Hungary: 
Administration and profit amounts cca. 30-35% of price. 
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Officer of the Ministry of Interior National Directorate General for Disaster 
Management 
March 1, 2002 
 
 
Figures from the last flood: 
 
The reconstruction costs were initially estimated to 25 000 HUF/m2; this figure was 
finally adjusted upwards to 100 000 HUF/m2.  
 
The first estimation of the damages in the Bereg basin was that the direct losses (private 
households only) summed up to 5 billion HUF (direct losses). Finally, the losses were 
estimated to 15 billion HUF (this is what government paid, plus insurance companies 
paid 2.8 billion HUF. The large difference shows that government compensation may 
have been too generous). If buildings belonging to the central government, crop 
damages, damages in public infrastructure, etc. are included, the total losses sum up to 
50 billion HUF. 
 
There are three explanations to why the initial estimation of the losses was much lower 
than the final figures. 
4. The damages of adobe houses are revealed in different time steps; direct 
damages show immediately after the flood. Secondary damages show when the 
house dries up, these can be cracks in the walls etc. 
5. People who made the first estimates were not real experts. If insurance 
companies had made it, estimates would have been much closer to real costs. In 
addition, first estimates were made at the time of flood protection). 
6. Reconstruction costs were much larger than what was originally expected. A 
consortium consisting of five construction companies was assigned to the task of 
reconstructing the damaged houses. Mr The interviewee let us understand that it 
probably wasn’t the cheapest way to rebuild the houses.  
 
After the 2001 flood, the government compensated all property owners, even the 
households who had private flood insurance. When flooding happened earlier (1999, 
2000) the governmental compensation-procedure looked different, the insurance 
compensation was then deducted from what was compensated by the government. But 
this last flood was considered to be the responsibility of the government, as it was a 
primary levee that burst (earlier this was not the case). Furthermore, political 
considerations were made – if the governmental compensation was reduced this time, 
nobody would buy private flood insurance in the future. 
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The government offered following compensation alternatives after the last flood (Bereg 
basin): 
 
6. The property owner receives a new house in the same location, built in a 
material better suited to stand future floods (concrete house, standing on a 1.5 
meter high foundation – this flood was about 1 meter high).  
Applied for: Severely damaged houses (destroyed). 
7.  The house is renovated on the expense of the government. 
Applied for: Moderately damaged houses. 
8. The property owners could choose to leave the basin and buy a house of similar 
standard in other municipalities (but only within the county), with less flood 
risk. The old damaged house was then taken down. The government paid for the 
new house, controls were made to assure that the new house was of similar 
standard etc.  
Applied for: Severely damaged houses (destroyed) and for moderately 
damaged houses. 
9. The property owners were given cash economic compensation; the size of the 
compensation handed out was lower than renovation costs for the house (25 000 
HUF/m2 for adobe house, 50 000 HUF/m2 for non-adobe house).  
 
People who received new houses must not sell them for 15 years. 
 
Impacts: Since 206 people bought other houses, demand and real estate prices went up. 
(But the market values of the new houses are still about the half of the reconstruction 
costs). People have to spend much more money for the utility fees in these large, new 
houses (e.g., gas central heating, closed septic tanks – technically better solutions but 
expensive) 
 
The property owners with damaged houses made the following choices (when 98 % of 
the households had made their choices): 
1. 766 house owners received a new house on the same location 
2. 1719 house owners had their homes renovated 
3. 206 house owners choose to move out 
4. 183 house owners received cash economical compensation 
 
Opinion about the insurance options: The French system is preferred, but without 
making the insurance mandatory (this would be infeasible anyway). The government 
should help to make insurance more attractive (for example, insurance fees could be 
deducted from tax). It would be desirable that more people have insurances. 
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Currently, insurance companies pay 1% of their profit (1.5 billion HUF in total) to the 
government; this money is used for fire protection purposes. Such system could be 
extended to natural catastrophes. Cat-fund would be a good idea, as it has existed 
before, but the current government dismantled it. 
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APPENDIX 3:  
PRESENTATION OF SIMULATIONS OF THREE FLOOD 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES: THE PALAD-CSECSEI BASIN 
Lisa Brouwers and Karin Hansson 
{lisa, karinh@dsv.su.se} 
Introduction 
In the design of different possible flood management policy scenarios, a key interest has 
been to find the balance between social solidarity and private/community responsibility. 
In this document, the consequences of imposing three different flood insurance policy 
scenarios are investigated. The studied scenarios are not necessarily optimal in any 
respect, but are constructed for the purpose of illuminating significant effects of 
adopting different insurance policies. Therefore, a main focus in this investigation is on 
insurance schemes in combination with compensation from the government. In 
particular, the subsidiary level has been taken into account, i.e. the amount of money 
transferred from the low-risk areas to the high-risk areas and from richer property-
owners to poorer. 
 
The simulations of the policy scenarios are based on data generated by a 
geographically explicit model for the Palad-Csecsei basin. This basin is situated in the 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County. There are 4621 inhabitants in the basin and 2580 
private properties. The county consists of 11 municipalities, of which mainly two 
experience flood damages. 
 
Figure 1. The Pilot basin experiencing a 1000-year flood.  Failure at location 1. 
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Only floods resulting from levee failures are taken into account in the simulations. A 
levee failure occurs if a levee is overtopped or if it breaks and the water inundates 
neighbouring land. Groundwater related floods are excluded.  
 
In the simulation model, levee failures may occur in one of three different locations. 
The levee failures result from floods of three magnitudes (100-year, 150-year, and 
1000-year). There may be at most one levee failure per year. Each policy scenario is 
simulated for a 10-year period (a decade). The simulation of each policy scenario is 
iterated 10 000 times (100 000 years).  
 
The probability distribution for the nine levee failure scenarios is presented in the 
appendix. Based on this distribution, the ‘failure history’ of 10 000 decades was 
produced. In most years, and also in most decades, no levee failures occurred. The same 
‘failure history’ is used for the simulations of the three different policy scenarios. For 
each of the nine failure scenarios, a damage-function decides the economical damage 
for each property. The distribution of households with insurance is also fixed. Before 
the start of all simulations it was randomly determined for each property whether it was 
insured or not, based on the frequency of insured households in the region. This 
insurance choice for each property (insurance/no insurance) was fixed during all years, 
decades and simulations. 
 
The output data of the simulations are: 
• Governmental load:  
Compensation from government (plus subsidies in Scenario 3) 
• Balance for the insurance companies:  
Premiums to flood insurance (2 per cent of total premiums if bundled) − 
Compensation from insurance companies 
• Balance for individual property-owners:  
Compensation from government + Compensation from insurance companies − 
Property damages − Premiums to flood insurance (2 per cent of total premiums 
if bundled) 
• Balance per municipality (not presented explicitly):  
Compensation from government + Compensation from insurance companies − 
Property damages − Premiums to flood insurance (2 per cent of total premiums 
if bundled). This balance is an aggregate of all individual property-owners’ 
balances in the municipality. 
• Balance for the entire Palad-Csecsei basin:  
Compensation from government + Compensation from insurance companies − 
Property damages − Premiums to flood insurance (2 per cent of total premiums 
if bundled). This balance is an aggregate of all municipalities’ balances. 
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The simulation rounds, consisting of 10 000 iterations of 10-year periods, produced 29 
unique outcomes for the balance of the government, the municipalities, and the pilot 
basin. There were 22 unique outcomes for the insurers and 6 for the individual property-
owner. The outcome is in this simulation the economic balance of a stakeholder, 
cumulated during a 10-year period.  
To give a clearer overview of the results, the unique outcomes are clustered into five 
groups, and a weighted average for each group is presented in a table. The weighted 
average of each group (and each stakeholder) is calculated accordingly:  
1. Each outcome in the group is multiplied by its frequency (number of decades it 
occurred).  
2. The different products are summed together. 
3. The sum is divided by the total number of occurrences in the group.  
The output data are also presented in histograms that are clustered in five groups for 
readability. The groups are the same that are used in the tables. ‘−100’ under a column 
means that the column represents the group with outcomes less than or equal to –100. 
The label always tells the upper limit of the group, the lower limit should be clear from 
the context. The height of the column tells the frequency (0 – 10 000) of the outcomes.  
The first group in the tables (and the highest column in the histograms) contains only 
one outcome, from the decades without failures.  
Policy Scenario 1: “Business As Usual” 
This scenario is a continuation of the current system, where the central government is 
the main bearer of the economical responsibility.  
The assumptions and settings are the following: 
• The government compensates 60 per cent of property damages. 
• 30 per cent of the households have private property insurance, a bundled insurance 
in which 2 per cent of the total premium accounts for flood insurance. 
• Holders of private (bundled) insurance are compensated by 80 per cent by the 
insurance company. 
• The insurance premium is not risk-based. It is based on the property-value (2 per 
cent of the property-value per year).  
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Results from simulations of scenario 1 
Governmental load 
Probability  Weighted Average Outcome
0,8818 (no failure) 0
0,0431 -9 372 425
0,0266 -122 222 481
0,0345 -227 255 130
0,0140 -794 509 286
Table 1. Governmental load, scenario 1. 
 
Governmental load, scenario 1
140 345 266 431
8818
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
-783 360 000 -213 525 000 -121 695 000 -5 850 000 0
 
Figure 2. Histogram: Governmental load, scenario 1 
The table and histogram in table 1 and figure 2 show that the costs for the government 
equal zero in most 10-year periods (in 88 per cent of the periods). In these decades no 
flood failures occur. In 431 decades the governmental load was in the range 5.8 million 
HUF to 121.7 million HUF. In the most extreme decade the load was slightly more than 
1 billion HUF. 
Balance for Pilot Basin 
The balance for the Pilot basin is aggregated for all 11 municipalities in the following 
figures. 
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Probability  Weighted Average Outcome
0,8818 (no failure) -2 276 800
0,0431 -17 932 566
0,0266 -230 715 672
0,0345 -434 214 423
0,0140 -1 540 519 800
Table 2. Pilot balance, scenario 1. 
 
Pilot balance, scenario 1
140 345 266 431
8818
0
1000
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4000
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7000
8000
9000
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-1 519 656 800 -408 761 800 -229 851 800 -9 826 800 -2 276 800
 
Figure 3. Histogram: Balance in entire Pilot basin. 
 
The table and the histogram show that the result was negative in most decades; in 88 per 
cent the deficit amounted to 2 276 800 HUF. This is due to premium payments without 
retrieval of compensation. In 431 time-periods the result was more negative, in the 
range –9.8 million HUF to –229.8 million HUF to, see figure 3. In the most extreme 
decade the pilot basin made a negative result of 1.9 billion HUF. 
 
Balance for Insurance Companies 
When the balance for the insurance companies was investigated, only premium incomes 
from the Pilot basin was considered. Note that only 30 per cent of the property-owners 
in this region carry property insurance, as compared to 60 per cent in Hungary in total. 
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Probability  Weighted Average Outcome
0,8818 (no failure) 2 276 800
0,0431 -3 936 425
0,0266 -54 470 117
0,0345 -96 047 548
0,0140 -313 335 200
Table 3. Insurers balance, scenario 1. 
 
Insurers balance, scenario 1
140 345 266 431
8818
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
-308 183 200 -89 463 200 -54 103 200 -3 823 200 2 276 800
 
Figure 4. Histogram: Insurance companies balance, scenario 1.  
 
The simulations show that the insurance companies make a profit in most decades, since 
they receive flood premiums (2 per cent of the bundled property insurance premium) 
while no compensations are paid, see figure 4. In decades with limited flood failures the 
balance is slightly negative, premiums are not sufficient to balance the compensations. 
In extreme decades the shortage is larger, in 140 time-periods the deficit was greater 
than -308 million HUF. In the most flood-hit decade the deficit amounted to -415 
million HUF. An explanation to why the insurance companies show a negative result in 
many decades is the low fraction of insured households. 
Balance for Individual Property-owner 
The results for the individuals vary considerably, primarily depending on the location of 
the property. Only results for an example individual, with insurance and living in a 
high-risk location, is presented here.  
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Probability Weighted Average Outcome 
0,88180 (no failure) -3 000
0,09130 1 347 000
0,02010 1 947 000
0,00520 2 697 000
0,00150 3 297 000
0,00010 4 647 000
Table 4. Individual balance, scenario1. 
 
Individual balance, scenario 1 
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913 
201 52 16
0 
1000 
2000 
3000 
4000 
5000 
6000 
7000 
8000 
9000 
10000 
-3000 1347000 1947000 2697000 3297000
 
Figure 5. Histogram: individual property-owner, scenario 1. 
In most decades the property-owner pays flood-premiums (300 HUF/year) without 
retrieving any compensation, since no levee failure occurs. When a failure occurs, the 
property-owner is compensated by the government (to 60 per cent of damages) and also 
by the insurance company, to 80 per cent of the damages. Because of this double-
compensation, the property-owner gains economically if there is a levee failure. Since 
the premiums are based on the property value alone, the geographical risk is not 
reflected in the size of the premium, property-owners with insurance in low-risk 
locations subsidy the premiums for property-owners in high-risk locations. In 16 
decades the property-owner profited largely, more than 3 million HUF.  
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Summary scenario 1 
1. The governmental load is extensive in this scenario; compensations to individual 
property-owners are high, in extreme occasions more than 1 billion HUF.  
2. Insurance companies in the pilot basin become insolvent (unless they have a large 
risk reserve) when there is a flood failure. As only 30 per cent of the property-
owners are insured, the premium income is not sufficient.  
3. Property-owners with insurance perform very well. They are doubly compensated; 
i.e. they are compensated by the government as well as by the insurance companies. 
The premiums are not risk-based, why a person in a high-risk area pays a subsidised 
premium. Individuals in high-risk areas can gain economically from flood failures. 
4. The pilot basin balance is negative in most decades, since costs for premiums are 
paid. Largest positive outcome was more than 500 million HUF; many households 
in the basin were doubly compensated from flood failures. 
 
Policy Scenario 2 "More Private Insurance" 
In this scenario a part of the economic responsibility is shifted from the government to 
the property-owners. This is done by lowering the compensation from the government, 
as well as lowering the compensation from the subsidised property insurance; insurance 
1. An additional insurance, insurance 2 is introduced, with a risk-based premium.  
The assumptions and settings are the following: 
• The government compensates (only) 30 per cent of property damages. 
• 30 per cent of the households have a bundled insurance, in which 2 per cent of 
the total premium accounts for flood insurance. This is referred to as insurance 
1. 
• Holders of insurance 1 are compensated by 40 per cent of the damages by the 
insurance company 
• The premium of insurance 1 is based on the property-value, 1 per cent of the 
property-value per year. 
• Holders of risk-based insurance 2 are compensated by 100 per cent. 
• 5 per cent of the households have a risk-based insurance (insurance2).  
• The premium of insurance 2 is risk-based. It is based on the expected damage 
per municipality divided by the number of properties in the municipality. 
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Results from the simulations of policy scenario 2 
 
Governmental load 
 
Probability Weighted Average Outcome
0,8818 (no failure) 0
0,0431 -4 686 212
0,0266 -61 111 241
0,0345 -113 627 565
0,0140 -397 254 643
Table 5. Governmental load, scenario 2. 
 
Governmental load, scenario 2
140 345 266 431
8818
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
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7000
8000
9000
10000
-391 680 000 -106 762 500 -60 847 500 -2 925 000 0
 
Figure 6. Histogram: Governmental load, scenario 2. 
Most decades result in no flood failures and no compensation is paid to the households. 
In 431 time-periods the compensation paid to households were in the range 2.9 million 
HUF to 60.8 million HUF. In 751 decades large compensation were paid, the largest 
load for a 10-year period was 514.4 million, note that this load was much less than in 
scenario 1. 
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Balance for Pilot Basin 
The balance for the entire basin (for 11 municipalities) shows, to some extent, how the 
area manages to recover when floods occur. A negative balance means that the region 
needs external aid. 
 
Probability Weighted Average Outcome
0,8818 (no failure) -2 469 598
0,0431 -22 480 543
0,0266 -314 940 162
0,0345 -586 785 004
0,0140 -2 039 027 705
Table 6. Pilot Balance, scenario 2. 
Pilot balance, scenario 2
140 345 266 431
8818
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-2 010 509 598 -552 587 098 -313 832 098 -12 619 598 -2 469 598
 
Figure 7. Histogram: Pilot basin balance, scenario 2. 
In all simulated decades the pilot basin shows a negative balance, in failure-free decades 
the losses are 2.5 million HUF, consisting of the insurance premiums. The negative 
balance for the pilot basin can be explained by the low compensation from the 
government and the relatively low compensation from the subsidised insurance, in 
combination with the low fraction of households with the additional, risk-based, 
insurance. Extreme losses occur in 140 decades; in the worst-case decade loss amounted 
to 2.6 billion HUF. 
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Balance for Insurance Companies 
The insurance companies receive premiums from two different insurances; one with 
subsidised premiums (30 per cent uptake rate in the Pilot basin) and one with risk-based 
premiums (5 per cent uptake rate). 
 
 
Probability Weighted Average Outcome
0,8818 (no failure) 2 276 800
0,0431 -4 074 660
0,0266 -31 356 868
0,0345 -57 104 532
0,0140 -212 081 938
Table 7. Insurers balance, scenario 2. 
Insurers balance, scenario 2
140 345 266 431
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10000
-209 010 402 -52 400 402 -30 970 402 -3 955 402 2 469 598
 
Figure 8. Histogram: balance for insurance companies. 
Figure 8 shows the balance for the insurance companies. The balance is calculated by 
taking incomes in form of premiums, both subsidised and risk-based minus 
expenditures in form of compensation to insured households. The result shows that the 
balance is positive in most time-periods; a positive balance of approximately 2 million 
HUF. During decades with large flood disasters, the insurance companies pay less 
compensation than they did in scenario 1. The reason for this is the low compensation 
level for the subsidised insurance (1) in combination with the low uptake rate of risk-
based insurance (2). The largest negative balance was 272.2 million HUF. 
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Balance for Individual Property-owner 
A property-owner, who has both subsidised insurance 1 and risk-based insurance 2, 
pays large premiums if the property is located in a high-risk area. Premium amounts to 
slightly more than 80 thousands HUF per decade for this individual (668 HUF/ month), 
see table 8. When a flood failure occurs the individual is compensated quite richly, from 
two insurances as well as from the government. 
 
Probability Weighted Average Outcome 
0,8818 (no failure) -80 184
0,0913 2 282 316
0,0201 3 332 316
0,0052 4 644 816
0,0015 5 694 816
0,0001 8 057 316
Table 8. Individual property-owner, scenario 2. 
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Figure 9. Histogram: balance for individual property-owner.   
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Summary scenario 2 
5. The governmental load is substantially smaller than in scenario 1. The largest loss 
was 514.4 million HUF. The reason for this is that the compensation level was 
considerably lower than in scenario 1. 
6. The Pilot basin balance shows a more negative result, since risk-based premiums are 
expensive for the property-owners and the compensation level is low for the 
subsidised insurance and from the government. In the worst-case scenario losses 
sum to 2.6 billion HUF. 
7. Insurance companies are showing a more balanced result than in scenario 1. The 
incomes are a bit lower and the expenditures are smaller. The major shortage was 
272 200 402 HUF. 
8. Most property-owners are worse off than in scenario 1, since only five per cent are 
assumed to have risk-based insurance. Risk-based premiums are very expensive in 
municipalities 1 and 2. The example individual (figure 9) pays more than 8 thousand 
HUF per year in premiums for insurance 1 and 2. However, when flooding causes 
damage to a highly insured household, the property-owner collects high 
compensation; the risk-based insurance (2) compensates 100 per cent, plus the 
compensation from insurance 1, plus the compensation from the government. 
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Policy Scenario 3: “Catastrophe Fund” 
In this scenario, a new institution is introduced, the all-hazard catastrophe fund. The 
fund combines the roles of the government and the insurance companies from scenarios 
1 and 2. It is mandatory for all property-owners to contribute to the governmentally run 
catastrophe fund. Flood victims are compensated with 60 per cent of the losses from the 
catastrophe fund. The relatively low compensation is intended to stimulate property-
owners to take own mitigation precautions. All property-owners must pay a mandatory 
fee of 1.5 per cent of their property value to the catastrophe fund per year.  
 
The assumptions and the settings are the following: 
 
• Compensation level is set to 60 per cent. 
• Low-income households are subsidised, the government pays their contribution (fee) to 
the catastrophe fund.  
• 60 per cent of the property-owners in the pilot basin are considered to be low-income 
households. 
 
Results from simulations of scenario 3: 
Balance for Catastrophe Fund 
The balance for the re-insurance fund is calculated following:  
fees from property-owners minus compensation to flood victims.  
Probability Weighted Average Outcome
0,8818 (no failure) 2 214 540
0,0431 -7 157 885
0,0266 -120 007 941
0,0345 -225 040 590
0,014 -792 294 746
Table 9. Catastrophe Fund balance, scenario 3. 
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Catastrophe-fund balance, scenario 3
140 345 266 431
8818
0
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10000
-781 145 460 -211 310 460 -119 480 460 -3 635 460 2 214 540
 
Figure 10. Balance for Catastrophe Fund 
 
Figure 10 shows that the balance for the all-hazard catastrophe fund is positive in most 
10-year periods. The surplus reaches more than 2 million HUF in failure-free decades. 
However, in 1182 ten-year periods, the catastrophe fund shows a negative balance. In 
431 decades the deficit is larger than 300 million HUF, and in 140 decades the losses 
amount to 700 million HUF. The worst-case scenario shows a deficit of 1 billion HUF. 
 
Governmental load 
The load for the government is not treated separately in this scenario, as the catastrophe 
fund is a governmental institution. The load of the government would equal the negative 
balances of the catastrophe fund plus the subsidy to the low-income households. 
 
Balance for entire Pilot basin 
The balance for the entire Pilot basin (including all municipalities) is the difference 
between compensations and premiums. 
 
Probability Weighted Average Outcome 
0,8818 (no failure) -2 214 540
0,0431 -24 083 531
0,0266 -287 400 329
0,0345 -532 476 511
0,014 -1 856 069 540
Table 10. Pilot balance, scenario 3. 
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Pilot balance, scenario 3
140 345 266 431
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-1 830 054 540 -500 439 540 -286 169 540 -15 864 540 -2 214 540
 
Figure 11. Balance for the Pilot basin, scenario 3. 
The balance for the pilot region shows a negative result in all decades, see figure 11.  
In most decades the balance is -2.2 million HUF. This corresponds to the fee paid to the 
catastrophe fund by the high-income households (40 per cent of the households). When 
failures occur, the balance is below 15.8 million HUF; the compensation is lower than 
the losses. The worst case scenario shows a deficit of as much as 2.4 billion HUF. 
 
Balance for Individual property-owner (not a low-income household) 
The balance for the individual property-owner consists of compensation from the 
insurance company minus fee to the all-hazard catastrophe fund minus property 
damages. 
 
Probability Weighted Average Outcome 
0,8818 (no failure) -2 250
0,0913 -1 352 250
0,0201 -1 952 250
0,0052 -2 702 250
0,0015 -3 302 250
0,0001 -4 652 250
Table 11. Individual property-owner, scenario 3. 
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Individual balance, scenario 3
16 52 201
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Figure 12. Individual property-owner, scenario 3.  
 
Figure 12 shows that the balance never becomes positive, as the compensation level is 
lower than the damages (60 per cent). The fee to the catastrophe fund is 225 HUF per 
year for this example household, which is not a low-income household. For a low-
income household, the government would however subsidise the entire fee.  
 
Summary scenario 3 
 
1. The governmental load is not presented explicitly in the 3rd scenario, however the 
government pays the fee for 60 per cent of the households in the region. 
Furthermore, the government would have to bail out the catastrophe fund when 
failures occur and the capital of the fund is insufficient. 
2. The balance for the catastrophe fund is positive when no failures occur. The risk 
reserve of the fund is not enough to compensate losses when failures occur, why the 
government would have to help out.  
3. The balance for the entire Pilot basin is negative in all decades. Compensation is 
lower than losses. The worst case scenario is a deficit of 2.4 billion HUF:  
4. The individual property-owners show a negative balance, in high-risk locations as 
well as in low-risk locations. Even a poor household that collects governmental 
support for the fee to the catastrophe fund shows a negative balance when a failure 
occurs, as the compensation is low. No possibilities for the individuals to buy 
additional insurance are included in this scenario. 
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Appendices 
The Simulation Model 
 
The Upper Tisza Basin Flood Simulation Model consists of five modules, between 
which data is passed. See Figure 13. For each simulated year, the estimated economical 
consequences of flood failures are compiled and saved in the Consequence Module.  
 
 
Figure 13. The five different modules in the Simulation Model 
 
Monte Carlo Module 
It is impossible to predict with certainty when and where flood will occur, random 
variables are used in the model to representing this uncertainty. These random variables 
represent whether there will be a levee failure or not, and where it will happen in that 
case. For each year, the variables are assigned random values from Monte Carlo 
module. The random outcome is passed to the Catastrophe module.  
 
Catastrophe Module 
At first, the value of the random variable flood is checked. In the simulation, only levee-
failures are considered. A failure occurs when a levee is either overtopped or it breaks. 
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Nine different scenarios are considered. More precisely, three locations where the 
failure occurs are analysed. For each of these, floods of three different magnitudes: 100-
year floods, 150-year floods, and 1000-year floods are assumed to cause the failures. 
The probabilities of the nine scenarios are presented in figure 14, below.  
 
Scenarios Prob Failure 
(overtopping 
or breakage) 
Prob Flood Yearly Prob 
100 year, location 1: 0,12 0,01 0,0012 
100 year, location 2: 0,20 0,01 0,002 
100 year, location3: 0,28 0,01 0,0028 
150 year, location1: 0,18 0,00667 0,0012 
150 year, location2: 0,22 0,00667 0,0015 
150 year, location3: 0,40 0,00667 0,0026 
1000 year, location1: 0,19 0,001 0,00019 
1000 year, location2: 0,33 0,001 0,00033 
1000 year, location3: 0,45 0,001 0,00045 
 
Figure 14. Probability-distribution for failure events (9 scenarios). 
 
The Catastrophe module calculates how the water overflows the levees in case of a 
failure; what land areas are inundated, and by how deep water (the probability 
distribution and the inundation functions are delivered by Vituki Consulting, Hungary). 
Spatial Module 
The basin is geographically represented in form of a grid, in which each cell represent 
an area of 10 m2. There are 1551* 1551 cells in the grid. For each cell, there is a rich 
amount of data for, e.g., soil type, land-use patterns digital elevations and property 
value. In the simulations, only structural losses are considered. Only 2508 of the cells 
contain property.  
Consequence Module  
This module is consulted when there has been a levee failure. For each inundated cell, 
the economic consequences are calculated. The Consequence module collects data on 
property values and vulnerability from the Spatial Module. The structural losses are 
estimated by a loss-function that is depending on initial property value and 
vulnerability. 
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Agent Module 
The various stakeholders represented in the model are: the property-owner, the 
insurance companies, and the government. In the end of each simulated year, the 
economical situation for all agents is updated. If there has been a levee failure during 
the year, the property-value is reduced for all flooded cells. Premiums are paid annually. 
The economic consequences are a result of current policy strategy, i.e., the size of the 
premiums and compensations  
Facts & Assumptions  
 
Geographical data 
 
County / Region 
Size of region (Upper Tisza region):   approx. 5 400 km2 
County:      Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 
Neighboring countries:   Slovakia, the Ukraine and Romania 
Land at risk for flood:    38 per cent (2 052 km2) 
No of settlements:     118 
No of towns:      4 
No of inhabitants:     200 000 
Density:     
Unemployment rate:     24 per cent 
Employment (branches): 
Agriculture:     35 per cent 
Industry:    25 per cent 
Service:    40 per cent 
Main crops: 
      Corn 
      Wheat 
      Sunflower  
      Fruits 
Pilot basin 2.55 
No of properties:    2 508  
No of inhabitants:    4 621     
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Municipality Inhabitants Properties 
Tiszakorod 780 407 
Tiszacsecse 263 203 
Milota 939 460 
Sonkad 4 6 
Tiszbecs 1 048 429 
Uszka 295 153 
Botpalad 581 413 
Magosliget 240 169 
Tiszaberek 0 0 
Kishodos 0 0 
Kispalad 471 340 
River & flooding 
Highest water run off from 1 km2 (100-year flood):   2500 l/sec 
Water run-off in low land areas (100-year flood)  500 l/sec 
Increase of peak water levels past 95 years:   [0.35—0.73 cm/year] 
Strength of major flood waves:                    100 times larger than low 
(summer) level discharges 
Max water flow:       4000 m3/sec 
Max increase of water level:      11—12 meters 
Mitigation 
Levees:  627 km primary levee and  
a 94 km secondary levee 
Standard of levees:  260 km of levee below 
standard (too low levee) 
No of reservoirs (in the catchment area):    9 
Total capacity of reservoirs:      576 million m3 
Location of existing reservoirs:  mainly Romania, in the 
future  
        possibly in Ukraine 
History of major floods:  1970 (levee breaches), 
1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 
2000, and 2001 (dike burst) 
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Consequences of 2001 flood:  
No of inundated settlements     11    
No of evacuated people     17 000  
No of collapsed houses     200  
No of damaged houses     5 600   
Estimated total losses      23 billion HUF (76 million USD) 
 
Levee failure probabilities 
scen 1    = [0,12 * 1/100]   = 0.0012 
scen 2                                 = 0.0020 
scen 3                                 = 0.0028 
scen 4                                 = 0.0012 
scen 5                                 = 0.0015 
scen 6                                 = 0.0027 
scen 7                                 = 0.00018 
scen  8                                = 0.00033 
scen 9                                 = 0.00045 
 
Current Compensation Policies (government and insurance companies) 
No statuary duty for the Government to compensate, but this is the practise anyway at 
least when a failure of a major levee occurs as this is considered the responsibility of the 
government. Insurance companies may limit pay-outs, for instance (Green): either for 
one property (5 million HUF) or total pay-outs (200 million , 400 million HUF). 
 
Mitchell: 
No of property insurers in Hungary    14 
AB Aegon (the Netherlands)     56.4 % of market 
Hungaria (German)      22.6 % of market 
OTP-Granacia       17.9 % of market 
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Scenario Settings 
Settings are summarized per scenario 
Policy Scenario 1: "Business As Usual" 
This scenario is a continuation of the current system, where government is the main 
bearer of the economical responsibility. The assumptions are the following: 
Insurance Companies  
Insurance type: Bundled with voluntary property/fire policies. 
• Compensation (per cent of losses):     80 per cent 
• Premium size (per cent of property value):   2 per cent  
• Part of the total premium that constitutes flood insurance:  2 per cent 
• Insurance rate (in the basin 5.1)      30 per cent 
Government  
• Compensation        60 per cent 
Policy Scenario 2 "More Private Insurance" 
In this scenario part of the responsibility is shifted from the government to the 
individual. This is done by lowering the compensation from the government as well as 
the compensation from the subsidised property insurance. A second, risk-based 
insurance is introduced. 
 
Insurance Companies  
• Compensation from insurance 1 (Subsidised insurance):  40 per cent 
• Compensation from insurance 2 (Risk-based insurance): 100 per cent 
• Premium size insurance 1, per cent of property value:  1 per cent 
• Premium size insurance 2,               risk based (expected 
losses for the municipality, divided by the number of properties in the municipality) 
• Insurance rate, insurance 1:      30 per cent 
• Insurance rate, insurance 2:      5 per cent 
   
Government  
Compensation         30 per cent 
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Scenario 3 (Catastrophe Fund) 
 
A governmentally run catastrophe fund is introduced, it takes over the role of the 
insurance companies primarily. 
 
• Take-up rate to the fund (mandatory)     100 per cent 
• Fee size (based on property value):    1.5 per cent 
• Compensation:        60 per cent 
• Poverty rate (the proportion of property-owners in the pilot basin, that cannot afford 
premiums), the re-insurance fund will pay the insurance premium for those: 
         60 per cent 
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APPENDIX 4: DETAILED OUTPUT FROM THE SIMULATIONS 
Scenario 1 Frequency Outcome 
Governmental Load  
 
 8818 0
 
238 -5 850 000
 
5 -11 700 000
 185 -13 635 000
 2 -19 485 000
 1 -27 270 000
 250 -121 695 000
 10 -127 545 000
 6 -135 330 000
 240 -213 525 000
 4 -219 375 000
 10 -227 160 000
 43 -239 685 000
 7 -243 390 000
 1 -245 535 000
 1 -251 385 000
 2 -253 320 000
 28 -278 370 000
 6 -335 220 000
 1 -361 380 000
 1 -400 065 000
 1 -427 050 000
 111 -783 360 000
 4 -789 210 000
 1 -796 995 000
 19 -815 355 000
 2 -905 055 000
 2 -996 885 000
 1 -1 028 880 000
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Pilot Balance   
 8818 -2 276 800
 238 -9 826 800
 5 -17 376 800
 185 -27 991 800
 2 -35 541 800
 1 -53 706 800
 250 -229 851 800
 10 -237 401 800
 6 -255 566 800
 240 -408 761 800
 4 -416 311 800
 10 -434 476 800
 43 -456 821 800
 7 -457 426 800
 1 -464 371 800
 1 -471 921 800
 2 -482 536 800
 28 -531 006 800
 6 -636 336 800
 1 -684 396 800
 1 -758 581 800
 1 -815 246 800
 111 -1 519 656 800
 4 -1 527 206 800
 1 -1 545 371 800
 19 -1 579 171 800
 2 -1 747 231 800
 2 -1 926 141 800
 1 -1 985 656 800
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Insurers Balance   
 8818 2 276 800
 423 -3 823 200
 8 -9 923 200
 250 -54 103 200
 16 -60 203 200
 240 -89 463 200
 14 -95 563 200
 43 -102 443 200
 3 -108 543 200
 7 -110 483 200
 1 -114 643 200
 28 -118 523 200
 6 -145 843 200
 1 -158 823 200
 1 -174 903 200
 1 -181 203 200
 111 -308 183 200
 5 -314 283 200
 19 -323 323 200
 2 -364 563 200
 2 -399 923 200
 1 -415 063 200
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Scenario 2  Frequency Outcome 
Governmental Load  
 
 8818 0
 238 -2 925 000
 5 -5 850 000
 185 -6 817 500
 2 -9 742 500
 1 -13 635 000
 250 -60 847 500
 10 -63 772 500
 6 -67 665 000
 240 -106 762 500
 4 -109 687 500
 10 -113 580 000
 43 -119 842 500
 7 -121 695 000
 1 -122 767 500
 1 -125 692 500
 2 -126 660 000
 28 -139 185 000
 6 -167 610 000
 1 -180 690 000
 1 -200 032 500
 1 -213 525 000
 111 -391 680 000
 4 -394 605 000
 1 -398 497 500
 19 -407 677 500
 2 -452 527 500
 2 -498 442 500
 1 -514 440 000
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Pilot Balance   
 8818 -2 469 598
 238 -12 619 598
 5 -22 769 598
 185 -34 677 098
 2 -44 827 098
 1 -66 884 598
 250 -313 832 098
 10 -323 982 098
 6 -346 039 598
 240 -552 587 098
 4 -562 737 098
 10 -584 794 598
 43 -617 217 098
 7 -625 194 598
 1 -627 367 098
 1 -637 517 098
 2 -649 424 598
 28 -714 284 598
 6 -863 949 598
 1 -928 579 598
 1 -1 025 647 098
 1 -1 102 704 598
 111 -2 010 509 598
 4 -2 020 659 598
 1 -2 042 717 098
 19 -2 092 842 098
 2 -2 321 872 098
 2 -2 560 627 098
 1 -2 642 959 598
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Insurers Balance   
 8818 2 469 598
 423 -3 955 402
 8 -10 380 402
 250 -30 970 402
 16 -37 395 402
 240 -52 400 402
 14 -58 825 402
 43 -61 890 402
 7 -64 410 402
 3 -68 315 402
 28 -74 430 402
 1 -74 740 402
 6 -85 840 402
 1 -95 330 402
 1 -107 270 402
 1 -107 870 402
 111 -209 010 402
 5 -215 435 402
 19 -217 330 402
 2 -242 450 402
 2 -263 880 402
 1 -272 200 402
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Scenario 3  
Governmental Load 
Frequency Outcome 
 8818 2 214 540
 238 -3 635 460
 5 -9 485 460
 185 -11 420 460
 2 -17 270 460
 1 -25 055 460
 250 -119 480 460
 10 -125 330 460
 6 -133 115 460
 240 -211 310 460
 4 -217 160 460
 10 -224 945 460
 43 -237 470 460
 7 -241 175 460
 1 -243 320 460
 1 -249 170 460
 2 -251 105 460
 28 -276 155 460
 6 -333 005 460
 1 -359 165 460
 1 -397 850 460
 1 -424 835 460
 111 -781 145 460
 4 -786 995 460
 1 -794 780 460
 19 -813 140 460
 2 -902 840 460
 2 -994 670 460
 1 -1 026 665 460
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Pilot Balance   
 8818 -2 214 540
 238 -15 864 540
 5 -29 514 540
 185 -34 029 540
 2 -47 679 540
 1 -65 844 540
 250 -286 169 540
 10 -299 819 540
 6 -317 984 540
 240 -500 439 540
 4 -514 089 540
 10 -532 254 540
 43 -561 479 540
 7 -570 124 540
 1 -575 129 540
 1 -588 779 540
 2 -593 294 540
 28 -651 744 540
 6 -784 394 540
 1 -845 434 540
 1 -935 699 540
 1 -998 664 540
 111 -1 830 054 540
 4 -1 843 704 540
 1 -1 861 869 540
 19 -1 904 709 540
 2 -2 114 009 540
 2 -2 328 279 540
 1 -2 402 934 540
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Insurers Balance   
 8818 2 469 598
 423 -3 955 402
 8 -10 380 402
 250 -30 970 402
 16 -37 395 402
 240 -52 400 402
 14 -58 825 402
 43 -61 890 402
 7 -64 410 402
 3 -68 315 402
 28 -74 430 402
 1 -74 740 402
 6 -85 840 402
 1 -95 330 402
 1 -107 270 402
 1 -107 870 402
 111 -209 010 402
 5 -215 435 402
 19 -217 330 402
 2 -242 450 402
 2 -263 880 402
 1 -272 200 402
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APPENDIX 5: THE EXTENDED DELTA METHOD (EDM) 
Mats Danielson & Love Ekenberg 
 
ABSTRACT 
The method used for evaluating the flood risk management policy decision problem in 
the Upper Tisza Basin (UTB) is based on the Delta method (Danielson 98). It has been 
further developed and extended to handle a problem model in which several 
stakeholders’ outcomes can be handled on a per consequence basis. Thus, it is a multi-
criteria extension to the basic probabilistic method. Previously, the Delta method was 
able to handle either probabilistic or criteria models, but not both. With symmetrical 
trees, as in the problem treated in this report, both can be handled. Further, the use of 
multi-level trees, which was previously only a theoretical possibility, has now been field 
tested. 
In EDM, the decision-maker automatically makes his problem statements more 
visible and only with the precision he feels he has evidence for at that moment. This 
brings about a number of advantages. First, he must make the underlying information 
clear, and second, the statements can be the subject of discussions with (and criticism 
from) other participants in the decision process. Third, it can also be seen more clearly 
which information is required in order to take the problem closer to a decision and 
within which areas some more information must be gathered before a well-founded 
decision can be made. Fourth, arguments for (and against) a specific selection can be 
derived from the analysis material. Fifth, the decision can be better documented, and the 
underlying information as well as the reasoning leading up to a decision can be traced 
afterwards. The decision can even be changed in a controlled way, should new infor-
mation become available at a later stage. 
First, a general introduction to the method is given. Following that, the conceptual 
model is discussed, and finally, the evaluation procedure and its interpretations are 
treated. 
 
Introduction 
Suppose a decision-maker wants to evaluate a specific decision situation. In order to 
approach the problem in a reasonable way, given available resources, a decision process 
such as the following could be employed, not necessarily in the exact order given. 
• Clarify the problem, divide it into sub-problems if necessary 
• Decide which information is a prerequisite for the decision 
• Collect and compile the information 
• Define possible courses of action 
• For each alternative: 
 • Identify possible consequences 
 • For each consequence: 
  • Estimate how probable it is 
  • Estimate the value of it occurring for each stakeholder 
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• Disregard obviously bad courses of action 
• Based on the above, evaluate the remaining alternatives 
• Carry out a sensitivity analysis 
The method described in the following should be seen in the context of such a decision 
process.  
 
The EDM process 
The EDM process is carried out in a number of steps. The first step is a bit special, since 
there is much information to collect. The initial information is gathered from different 
sources. Then it is formulated in statements and entered into the computer tool. 
Following that, an iterative process commences where step by step the decision-makers 
gain further insights. During this process, the decision-makers receive help in realizing 
which information is missing, is too vague, or is too precise. They might also change 
the problem structure by adding or removing consequences or even entire alternatives, 
as more information becomes available. 
 
Information
Gathering Statements
Evaluations
Sanity
Checks
Sensitivity
Analyses
Security
Levels
 
Figure 1 The EDM process 
Information Gathering 
In some cases, the first information collection phase can be a very long and tedious step. 
Sometimes, it might take man-months. In other cases, it might only require a few half-
day discussions with experts. It is impossible to describe any typical case because the 
situations are too diverse. In the Upper Tisza Basin case, much work ranging from 
interviews to simulation was required. 
Modeling 
After the data collection phase, a modeling task commences where the decision-maker 
structures and orders the information. Given the set of stakeholders, he tries to compile 
a smaller number of reasonable courses of action and identify the consequences 
belonging to each alternative. In the UTB case, simulation results were clustered into 
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meaningful sets. There is no requirement for the alternatives to have the same number 
of consequences. However, within any given alternative, it is required that the conse-
quences are exclusive and exhaustive, i.e. whatever the result, it should be covered by 
the description of exactly one consequence. This is unproblematic, since a residual 
consequence can be added to take care of unspecified events. 
The probability and value statements plus the weights are represented by interval 
constraints and core intervals described later. Intervals are a natural form in which to 
express such imprecise statements. It is not required that the consequence sets are 
determined from the outset. A new consequence may be added at a later stage, thus 
facilitating an incremental style of working.  
 
Decision Frames 
In EDM, a decision frame represents a decision problem. The idea with such a frame is 
to collect all information necessary for the model in one structure. This structure is then 
filled in with user statements. All the probability statements in a decision problem share 
a common structure because they are all made relative to the same decision frame. They 
are translated and collected together in a probability base. For value statements, the 
same is done in a value base. Finally, stakeholder weights are also supplied. The 
correspondence between the user model and the representation is summarized in Table 
1. 
 
  User model Representation 
Decision problem Decision frame 
Alternative Consequence set 
Consequence, event Consequence 
Collection of statements Base 
Interval statement Core interval 
 Interval constraint 
Table 1  Representation of user model 
In practice, a model of the situation is created with stakeholders, relevant courses of 
action, and their consequences when specific events occur. The model is represented by 
a decision frame. The courses of action are called alternatives in the user model, and 
they are represented by consequence sets in the decision frame. If the problem contains 
more than one decision level, it is internally transformed into an alternative–
consequence form (AC-form), a one-level decision tree that is a computationally 
equivalent representation. In the user interface, all levels are kept as they were 
originally entered. Following the establishment of a decision frame in the tool, the 
probabilities of the events and the values of the consequences are subsequently filled in. 
A part of the user multi-level tree for UTB is shown in figure 2. For the first scenario, 
the three most likely outcomes are shown with their probability and value ranges. The 
last level is the local weights as described later. 
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Figure 2: A multi-level tree for UTB 
Frame Structure 
A decision frame must capture the structure of the tree internally in the tool once 
transformed into one-level form. A one-level tree consists primarily of sets of conse-
quences. Then, there are statements of probability and value collected in structures 
called constraint sets and cores.  
Definition:  Given a set of variables S = {xi}, a continuous function g:S
n
→[0,1], and real 
numbers a,b ∈ [0,1] with a ≤ b, an interval constraint g(x1,…,xn) ∈ [a,b] is a shorter form for 
a pair of weak inequalities g(x1,…,xn) ≥ a and g(x1,…,xn) ≤ b. 
In this manner, both equalities and inequalities can be handled in a uniform way since 
equalities are represented by intervals [a,a]. A collection of interval constraints 
concerning the same set of variables is called a constraint set. It follows that a constraint 
set can be seen as a system of inequalities. For such a system to be meaningful, there 
must exist some vector of variable assignments that satisfies each inequality in the 
system simultaneously. 
Definition:  Given a set of variables {xi}, a constraint set X in {xi} is consistent iff the system 
of weak inequalities in X has a solution.2 Otherwise, the constraint set is inconsistent. A 
constraint Z is consistent with a constraint set X iff the constraint set {Z} ∪ X is consistent. 
In other words, a consistent constraint set is a set where the constraints are at least not 
contradictory. 
                                                
2Then there is a non-empty solution set for X. 
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Definition:  Given a consistent constraint set X in {xi} and a function f, 
Xmax(f(x)) =def  sup(a  {f(x) > a} ∪ X is consistent). Similarly, 
Xmin(f(x)) =def  inf(a  {f(x) < a} ∪ X is consistent) 
The orthogonal hull is a concept that in each dimension signals which parts are 
definitely incompatible with the constraint set. The orthogonal hull can be pictured as 
the result of wrapping the smallest orthogonal hyper-cube around the constraint set. 
Definition:  Given a consistent constraint set X in {xi}i∈I, the set of pairs 
{〈Xmin(xi),Xmax(xi)〉} is the orthogonal hull of the set and is denoted 〈Xmin(xi),Xmax(xi)〉n. 
Constraints and core intervals have different roles in specifying a decision situation. The 
constraints represent “negative” information, which vectors are not part of the solution 
sets. The contents of constraints specify which ranges are infeasible by excluding them 
from the solutions. This is in contrast to core intervals, which represent “positive” 
information in the sense that the decision maker enters information about sub-intervals 
that are felt to be the most central ones and that no further discrimination is possible 
within those ranges.  
Definition:  Given a constraint set X in {xi} and the orthogonal hull 〈ai,bi〉n of X, a core 
interval of xi is an interval [ci,di] such that ai ≤ ci ≤ di ≤ bi. A core [ci,di]n of {xi} is a set of 
core intervals {[ci,di]}, one for each xi. 
As for constraint sets, the core might not be meaningful in the sense that it may contain 
no possible variable assignments able to satisfy all the inequalities. This is quite similar 
to the concept of consistency for constraint sets, but for core intervals, the requirement 
is slightly different. It is required that the focal point is contained within the core. 
Definition:  Given a consistent constraint set X in {xi} and a focal point r = (r1,…,rn), the 
core [ci,di]n of {xi} is permitted with respect to r iff ci ≤ ri ≤ di. 
Together, constraint sets and cores delimit the shape of the belief in the numerical 
values for the variables, see figure 3. 
Focal point
Core
Hull
Belief
Value
 
Figure 3: The hull, core and focal point for a variable 
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Bases 
A base consists of a constraint set for a set of variables together with a core. A base is 
simply a collection of constraints and the core that belongs to the variables in the set. 
The idea with a base is to represent a class of functions over a finite, discrete set of 
consequences. 
Definition:  Given a set {xi} of variables and a focal point r, a base X in {xi} consists of a 
constraint set XC in {xi} and a core XK of {xi}. The base X is consistent if XC is consistent and 
XK is permitted with respect  
to r. 
Probability Bases 
The collection of probability statements in a decision situation is called the probability 
base. A probability base is said to be consistent if it can be assigned at least one real 
number to each variable so that all inequalities are simultaneously satisfied. The idea is 
that no meaningful operations can take place on a set of statements that have no variable 
assignments in common, since there is no way to take all the requirements into account. 
Note that the method deals with classes of functions of which there are infinitely many 
instantiations, and insists on at least one of them yielding consistent results. 
Definition:  Given a set {Cik} of disjoint and exhaustive consequences, a base P in {pik}, and a 
discrete, finite probability mass function ∏:C→[0,1] over {Cik}. Let pik denote the function 
value ∏(Cik). ∏ obeys the standard probability axioms, and thus pik ∈ [0,1] and ∑k pik = 1 are 
default constraints in the constraint set PC. Then P is a probability base. 
Thus, a probability base can be seen as characterizing a set of discrete probability 
distributions. The core PK can be thought of as an attempt to estimate a class of mass 
functions by estimating the individual discrete function values. 
 
Value Bases 
 
Requirements similar to those for probability variables can be found for value variables. 
There are apparent similarities between probability and value statements but there are 
differences as well. The normalization (∑k pik = 1) requires the probability variables of 
a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive consequences to sum to one. No such 
dimension reducing constraint exists for the value variables.  
Definition:  Given a set {Cik} of disjoint and exhaustive consequences, a base V in {vik}, and a 
discrete, finite value function Ω:C→[0,1]. Let vik denote the function value Ω(Cik). Because of 
the range of Ω, vik ∈ [0,1] are default constraints in the constraint set VC. Then V is a value 
base. 
Similar to probability bases, a value base can be seen as characterizing a set of value 
functions. The value core VK can be seen as an attempt to estimate a class of value 
functions.  
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The probability and value bases together with structural information constitute the 
decision frame. 
 
Frames 
Using the above concepts of consequence, constraint, core, and base, it is possible to 
model the decision-makers’ situation in a decision frame. Compare the decision frame 
to Table 1 at the beginning of the appendix. The frame captures a decision problem on 
AC-form, a one-level tree problem in normal form. The frame is also the key data 
structure in the tool implementation, holding references to other structure information 
and to the bases containing most of the information. All statements entered via the tool 
user interface are collected in the decision frame. When all statements in the current 
state of the problem have been entered, the data entry phase is over for the time being. 
As the insights into the decision problem accumulate during all the following phases, it 
is possible to add new information and alter or delete information already entered. 
 
Sanity Checks 
Thereafter, the work continues with evaluating the alternatives. It begins by comparing 
the alternatives as they are entered. As the first evaluation step, the sanity of the 
decision frame is checked. Much information collected, especially in large 
investigations, run the risk of being cluttered or misunderstood during the process. If 
some data in the frame is problematic, the decision-maker could consider leaving it out 
of the current cycle or recollecting it. Missing data is easily handled for later inclusion. 
For example, a missing consequence can be added at a later stage. If the set of 
consequences for some alternative is not exhaustive, a residual consequence can be tem-
porarily added. Missing value constraints can be temporarily substituted with very wide 
intervals or just left out. Such possibilities have certain advantages as the results 
emerging at the outset of the evaluation may be viewed with greater confidence than if 
erroneous data is entered. 
 
Security Levels 
Many decisions are one-off decisions, or are important enough not to allow a too 
undesirable outcome regardless of its having a very low probability. The common 
aggregate decision rules will not rule out an alternative with such a consequence 
provided it has a very low probability. If the probability for a very undesirable 
consequence is larger than some security level, it seems reasonable to require that the 
alternative should not be considered, regardless of whether expected value shows it to 
be a good course of action. If the security level is violated by one or more consequences 
in an alternative and this persists beyond a predetermined rate of cutting (described 
below), then the alternative is unsafe and should be disregarded. An example of security 
leveling is an insurance company desiring not to enter into insurance agreements where 
the profitability is high but there is a very small but not negligible risk for the outcome 
to be a loss large enough to put the company’s existence at stake. The security analysis 
requires some parameters to be set. Security levels is an important supplement to the 
expected value, but have not been used in the UTB case, mainly due to the fact that the 
different scenarios handle reinsurance in different ways. A security level setting would 
prohibit instances where an insurance company could go bankrupt, but this is usually 
solved by reinsurance instead. 
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Evaluations 
After having taken security levels into account, which value does a particular decision 
have? In cases where the outcomes can be assigned monetary values, it seems natural 
that the value of the decision should be some kind of aggregation of the values of the 
individual consequences. The ultimate comparing rule of an evaluation in EDM as well 
as in many other methods is the expected value (EV), sometimes instantiated as the 
expected utility or the expected monetary value. Since neither probabilities nor values 
are fixed numbers, the evaluation of the expected value yields quadratic (bilinear) 
objective functions of the form 
EV(Ai) = pi1vi1 + … + pinvin, 
where the pik’s and vik’s are variables. Further complicating the picture is the presence 
of different stakeholders, which have their own specific values that must be weighted 
together. For s stakeholders, this leads to the expression 
EV(Ai) = w1 (p1i1v1i1 + … + p1inv1in) + … + ws (psi1vsi1 + … + psinvsin), 
where wk is the importance weight of stakeholder k. 
Maximization of such expressions are computationally demanding problems to solve in 
the general case, using techniques from the area of non-linear programming. 
Fortunately, in the UTB case, the decision trees are symmetrical with respect to the 
stakeholders, i.e. the trees, the alternatives, the consequences, and thus the probabilities 
coincide. This leaves us with differing values and weights. By multiplying in the 
weights and making the probabilities common, the expression can be rewritten 
EV(Ai) = pi1 w1v1i1 + … + pin w1v1in + … + pi1 ws vsi1 + … + pin ws vsin, 
which finally is written 
EV(Ai) = pi1 (w1v1i1 + … + ws vsi1) + … + pin (w1v1in + … + ws vsin), 
thus permitting local (at consequence level) culling of weighted values. 
Maximization of such expressions are less but still computationally demanding 
problems to solve, using techniques from the area of quadratic programming. In 
(Danielson 98) there are discussions about and proofs of the existence of computational 
procedures to reduce the problem to systems with linear objective functions, solvable 
with ordinary linear programming methods. 
When a rule for calculating the EV for decision frames containing interval 
statements is established, the next question is how to compare the courses of action 
using this rule. It is not a trivial task, since usually the possible EVs of several 
alternatives overlap. The most favourable assignments of numbers to variables for each 
alternative usually render that alternative the preferred one. The fiirst step towards a 
usable decision rule is to establish some concepts that tell when one alternative is 
preferable to another. For simplicity, only two alternatives are discussed even though 
UTB contains three, but the reasoning can easily be generalized to any number of 
alternatives. 
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Definition:  The alternative A1 is at least as good as A2 if EV(A1) ≥ EV(A2) 
for all consistent assignments of the probability and value variables. 
 
The alternative A1 is better than A2 if it is at least as good as A2 and further 
EV(A1) > EV(A2) for some consistent assignments of the probability and 
value variables. 
 
The alternative A1 is admissible if no other alternative is better. 
If there is only one admissible alternative it is obviously the preferred choice. Usually 
there are more than one, since apparently good or bad alternatives are normally dealt 
with on a manual basis long before decision tools are brought into use. All non-
admissible alternatives are removed from the considered set and do not take further part 
in the evaluation. The existence of more than one admissible alternative means that for 
different consistent assignments of numbers to the probability and value variables, 
different courses of action are preferable. When this occurs, how is it possible to find 
out which alternative is to prefer? 
Let δ12 = EV(A1) – EV(A2) be the differences in expected value between the 
alternatives. The strength of A1 compared to A2, given as a number max(δ12) ∈ [–1,1], 
shows how the most favourable consistent assignments of numbers to the probability 
and value variables lead to the greatest difference in the expected value between A1 and 
A2. In the same manner, A2 is compared to A1. These two strengths need not sum to 
one or to any other constant – the first might for example be 0.2 and the second 0.4. If 
there are more than two alternatives, pair wise comparisons are carried out between all 
of them. 
 
Furthermore, there is a strong element of comparison inherent in a decision 
procedure. For example, statements such as v11 > v22 are not taken into account when 
calculating maximal and minimal EV(Ai) unless they influence the hull. As the results 
are interesting only in comparison to other alternatives, it is reasonable to consider the 
differences in strength as well. Therefore, it makes sense to evaluate the relative 
strength of A1 compared to A2 in addition to the strengths themselves, since such 
strength values would be compared to some other strengths anyway in order to rank the 
alternatives. The relative strength between the two alternatives A1 and A2 are 
calculated using the formula 
mid(δ12) = [max(δ12)+min(δ12)]/2 = [max(δ12) –max(δ21)]/2  
The concept of strength is actually somewhat more complicated. Dominance means that 
one consequence set is superior to another, at least in a part of the solution space to the 
bases. The weakest relation would be if “a part” refers to a single solution vector. A 
more reasonable interpretation of “a part” is if it is superior in a substantial fraction of 
the solutions. Dominance in the strongest sense would mean to require that the “part” 
consists of all solution vectors. This idea is captured in the concepts of strong, marked, 
and weak dominances. They correspond to the minimal, medium, and maximal 
differences. Alternative A1 is said to strongly dominate alternative A2 if min(δ12) > 0, 
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to markedly dominate if mid(δ12) > 0, and finally to weakly dominate if max(δ12) > 0. 
This is further explained in (Danielson 03). 
 
Cutting the Hull 
The hull cut is a generalized sensitivity analysis to be carried out in a large number of 
dimensions. In non-trivial decision situations, when a decision frame contains 
numerically imprecise information, the different principles suggested above are often 
too weak to yield a conclusive result by themselves. Only studying the differences in the 
expected value for the complete bases often gives too little information about the mutual 
strengths of the alternatives. Thus, after the elimination of undesirable consequence sets, 
the decision-maker could still find that no conclusive decision has been made. One way 
to proceed is to determine the stability of the relation between the consequence sets 
under consideration.  
A natural way to investigate this is to consider values near the boundaries of the 
constraint intervals as being less reliable than the core due to the former being 
deliberately imprecise. Hence, it is important to be able to study the strengths (or 
dominances) between the alternatives on sub-parts of the bases. If a dominance is 
evaluated on a sequence of ever-smaller sub-bases, a good appreciation of the strength’s 
dependency on boundary values can be obtained. This is taken into account by cutting 
off the dominated regions indirectly using the hull cut operation. This is denoted cutting 
the bases, and the amount of cutting is indicated as a percentage β, which can range 
from 0% to 100%. For a 100% cut, if no core is specified, the bases are transformed into 
single points, and the evaluation becomes the calculation of the ordinary expected value. 
Definition:  Given a base X, a set of real numbers {ai,bi}, a hull [ci,di]n, and a 
real number β ∈ [0,1], a β-cut of X is to replace the hull by [ci–(1–β)·(ai–ci), di–
(1–β)·(bi–di)]n. 
It is possible to regard the hull cut as an automated kind of sensitivity analysis. In order 
to maintain consistency, the cut decreases the bases in predefined ways. Since the belief 
in peripheral values is somewhat less, the interpretation of the cut is to zoom in on more 
believable values that are more centrally located.  
The principle can also be motivated by the difficulties of performing simultaneous 
sensitivity analysis in several dimensions at the same time. It can be hard to gain real 
understanding of the solutions to large decision problems using only low-dimensional 
analyses, since different combinations of dimensions can be critical to the evaluation 
results. Investigating all possible such combinations would lead to a procedure of high 
combinatorial complexity in the number of cases to investigate. Using hull cuts, such 
difficulties are circumvented. The evaluation idea behind the principle is to investigate 
how much the hull can be cut before dominance appears between the consequence sets 
compared. If there is no dominance even in the original core, it may be further cut 
towards the focal point in order to achieve dominance. The cut avoids the complexity 
inherent in combinatorial analyses, but it is still possible to study the stability of a result 
by gaining a better understanding of how important the constraint boundaries really are. 
By co-varying the cut of an arbitrary set of intervals, it is possible to gain much better 
insight into the influence of the structure of the decision frame on the solutions. 
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Consequently, a cut can be regarded as a focus parameter that zooms in from the full 
statement intervals to central sub-intervals (the core).  
The results of the comparisons can be displayed either in a diagram for each pair of 
alternatives (Delta diagrams) or as a summary for each alternative (Gamma diagrams). 
Figure 4 below deals only with Delta diagrams. 
In the figure, the evaluation of the three UTB scenarios is shown as three pairwise 
comparisons between the alternatives respectively. The x-axis shows the cut in per cent 
ranging from 0 to 100. The y-axis is the expected value difference δij for the pairs. The 
cone (which need not be linear if comparative statements are involved) consists of three 
lines. For comparing alternatives A1 and A2, the upper line is max(δ12), the middle is 
mid(δ12), and the lower is min(δ12). Thus, one can see from which cut level an 
alternative dominates weakly, markedly, and strongly. As the cut progresses, one of the 
alternatives eventually dominates strongly. The cut level necessary for that to occur 
shows the separability between the expected values. 
 
Figure 4: Evaluation of the UTB alternatives 
Sensitivity Analyses 
After the evaluation, a sensitivity analysis is the next step. The analysis tries to show 
what parts of the given information are most critical for the obtained results and must 
therefore be given extra careful consideration. This is accomplished by manually 
varying a number of statements in desired ways, increasing or decreasing intervals, 
modifying structural information, etc. The decision-maker might, however, have other 
ideas of interesting modifications to make to the bases, like decreasing or even 
increasing only selected intervals. He might have structural or problem specific 
information that leads him to manipulate certain intervals in special ways. A common 
strategy is decreasing intervals until only one alternative is admissible. It also points to 
which information is too vague to be of any assistance to the ongoing evaluation. Infor-
mation identified in this way is subject to reconsideration, thereby triggering an iteration 
in the EDM process. 
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Decision Process Results 
The selection procedure then continues with: 
(i) Remove all strongly dominated consequence sets 
(ii) If more than one consequence set remains 
 (ii a) Cut the frame until only one consequence set remains 
 (ii b) Remove the markedly dominated consequence sets 
 (ii c) A combination of (ii a) and (ii b) 
(iii) If only one consequence set remains 
 (iii a) Uncut the frame until other consequence sets appear 
 (iii b) Study the markedly dominated consequence sets 
 (iii c) A combination of (iii a) and (iii b) 
Before a new iteration starts, alternatives found to be undesirable or obviously inferior 
by other information could be removed from the decision process. Likewise, a new 
alternative can be added, should the information gathered indicate the need for it. 
Consequences in an alternative can be added or removed as necessary to reflect changes 
in the model. Often a number of cycles are necessary to produce an interesting and 
reliable result.  
After the appropriate number of iterations has been completed, both the decision 
problem and its proposed solution(s) in the form of preferred courses of action will be 
fairly well understood and documented. Anyone interested and with access to the 
information can afterwards check, verify (and criticize) the decision based on the output 
documentation, which because all consequences are clearly presented shows how all the 
alternative courses of action have been valued. Also, during the decision process, the 
analysis is open for comments and can become the basis for further discussions. 
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APPENDIX 6: DECISION TREE 
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